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ABSTRACT 
This report maps the extent of corporate power in the South African agro-food system using a value chain 
approach. It identifies major corporate actors in the various nodes of the agro-food system as of 2014. 
Some nodes tend to be dominated by corporations, for example input supply, grain storage and handling, 
and feedlots for commercial livestock. Other nodes have a strong corporate core but there is also a wide 
periphery, for example agricultural production, food manufacturing, wholesale and retail and consumer 
food service. The large periphery of marginalised actors in some parts of the system point to possible 
areas of intervention to boost livelihoods by supporting economic activity in the periphery. Although 
there are pockets of concentrated power in the system as a whole, there is also some distribution of 
power across nodes as well as between commodities. Vertical integration is less prevalent than in the 
past. The report looks at governance in the food system, the expansion of corporate self-regulation, and 
the implications for food security and nutrition. Corporations have immense power in structuring 
consumer perceptions on food quality and health, from input into apparently neutral dietary-based 
guidelines to advertising. Financialisation in the food system, including the institutionalisation of share 
ownership and the rise of agri-investment companies, and the multi-nationalisation of South African 
agro-food capital especially into Africa, have implications for the ability of the nation state to regulate 
activities in the agro-food system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report is an investigation into the structure of South African agro-food system, with a 
particular focus on the role of corporations. It is one of a series of state-of-knowledge reports 
commissioned for the Centre of Excellence in Food Security (CoE-FS) as part of the Value Chains 
Programme. The report should be read in conjunction with other research conducted as part of 
the programme and should be considered as a first phase to consolidate knowledge about 
specific topics in preparation for prioritisation to develop a research agenda for further work. 
The aim of the report is to provide an overview of some of the key features of the South African 
food system, with particular reference to its ability to ensure the food security of poor, 
vulnerable and marginal populations, and to provide livelihoods. In addition, it seeks to provide 
a conceptual platform for further research. In this respect this report tries to make initial 
connections between some of the key concepts that are proving central to the work of the CoE: 
concepts such as ‘food regimes’, ‘governance’, ‘agro-food systems’, ‘corporate power’, ‘value 
chains’, ‘consumer food environments’ and ‘local food geographies’, with the intention to 
develop a research agenda that can investigate these links in more detail in follow-up work. 
 
There is ample evidence that we are in the era of a corporate-led food regime. That is, corporate 
interests are dominant, both materially and in the ways in which the food system is understood 
and discussed. No overall mapping of the South African agro-food system or of corporate power 
in the system has been conducted to date. While there is some sense of corporate power in 
retail, in particular, there is no systematic review throughout the system. Bits and pieces of 
information are scattered about and these have been brought together, expanded on and 
updated, and initial efforts made to identify and fill gaps.  
 
The report is based on a loose value chain approach to mapping the agro-food system. The 
mapping starts with a schematic presentation of the overall agro-food system structure and the 
role of corporations in it. A short overview is followed with more detail on major nodes, 
including inputs to primary agriculture, logistics, primary agricultural production, food 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail and food service (prepared food consumed outside the 
home). At times the mapping is mostly descriptive, but for this first phase the main purpose is to 
get a picture of the whole system and the many parts to it. This will allow us to prioritise areas 
for more in-depth research following from this initial scan. 
 
System-wide and commodity-specific value chain governance is considered, looking at shifting 
forms of governance in South Africa, the greater role played by corporations in governance, and 
the strong corporate influence in shaping the consumer food environment (CFE). State policy is 
often absent or piecemeal, and much value chain governance is effectively in private hands. 
Understanding South Africa’s food system therefore requires careful attention to corporate 
practices, strategies and governance. Powerful corporate players actively shape the availability, 
affordability and acceptability of foods, and with this the broader CFE. These dynamics are 
implicated in the nutritional transition to unhealthy diets and subsequently a number of public 
health concerns. The corporate-dominated agro-food system is, therefore, a key mediator of 
food security for South Africans. 
 
The CFE essentially deals with the environment in which consumers make their food choices 
and the factors affecting it. The report goes on to describe and discuss some trends and 
dynamics of the contemporary food system, including agro-food trade, financialisation and 
institutionalisation of ownership, and the multinationalisation of South African agro-food 
capital (referring to capital in its productive form). The paper concludes with some reflections 
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2. THE CHANGING SOUTH AFRICAN AGRO-FOOD SYSTEM 
Corporate power has grown in the food system since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system and, in South Africa, the transition from apartheid. Global value chains have come into 
their own and there has been a general, if uneven, shift in control of productive processes from 
manufacturing to retail (Burch and Lawrence, 2009:268). The contemporary agro-food regime 
is characterised by the international extension and externalisation of manufacturing chains 
previously internalised within the organisational boundaries of vertically integrated 
corporations and, to a large extent, within nation states (Raikes, et al., 2000:3–4). World market 
prices have become decoupled or separated from actual regional production costs, with global 
political mechanisms at the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
then the World Trade Organisation (WTO) shaping prices (McMichael, 2005; Moore, 2010:240). 
This simultaneously indicates an ongoing role for the state and creates opportunities for 
concentration of production and centralisation of capital in the agro-food sector. 
 
Technological advances have led to significant changes in production and labour processes. The 
contemporary food regime incorporates flexible production and international sourcing on a 
scale not previously encountered, although the grounds were already laid before the 1970s. 
‘Flexible specialisation’ introduced a range of relatively cosmetic adaptations of a mass-
produced base product (Piore and Sabel, 1984) which have stimulated wider processes of 
market segmentation. Flexibility has become more important; the ability to respond quickly to 
opportunities and adapt activities accordingly. To varying extents, depending on the balance of 
power and ongoing labour struggles, some of the risk of this new flexibility is transferred to 
labour. Flexible labour is a global phenomenon, suggesting labour has lost ground in the battle 
over labour processes under the corporate regime. Flexible labour may benefit a smaller, 
higher-skilled core workforce, at a national scale, as well as at firm level. 
 
The ‘third technological revolution’ has seen gains in labour productivity, especially from the 
introduction of new information and communications technologies (ICTs) rooted in 
computerisation and information digitisation, and the rise to prominence of network forms of 
organisation (Castells, 1996). These technologies have revolutionised coordination activities, 
modifying both inter-firm relations (competition and cooperation) and producer-consumer 
interfaces. Goods with high informational content may be costly to create, but they can circulate 
at a near-zero marginal cost. The result is increasing returns to scale (decreasing average cost). 
The first consequence of growing returns to scale is a tendency towards concentration: the 
greater the production, the lower the average cost, giving a competitive advantage to the largest 
structures. The combination of scale and network effects results in the elaboration of business 
models which emphasise the necessity of being among the first to enter the market (Aglietta 
and Reberioux, 2005:14–15). 
 
Revolutionary innovations in ICTs affect both finance capital and productive capital. In finance, 
risk management and new financial instruments based on the commodification of risk have 
allowed the rapid growth of fictitious capital controlled by financial institutions (Bryan and 
Rafferty, 2010; Harvey, 2013). In production, ICTs have enabled just-in-time inventory 
management, flexible and agile supply chains and other production advances, with greater 
capacity to analyse large datasets (Busch, 2010:343), looking for and interpreting patterns. The 
enhanced ability to mine and use information facilitates the rise of intellectual property 
protection as a defining feature of value capture and extraction in the corporate regime 
(Stephan et al., 2006). 
 
For South Africa, the end of the Bretton Woods system globally generated a domestic monetary 
crisis, and crisis response congealed into what came to be neo-liberal policies, both nationally 
and globally. In every country these processes differ, based on unique histories, levels of 
capitalist development and integration, and existing institutions and relations of power. But 
 
 
Working paper 32, Stephen Greenberg 3 
common themes across the board are processes of privatisation, trade liberalisation, state 
deregulation and corporate self-regulation. These also occurred in South Africa as the agro-food 
system made the transition from a system built on the basis of tight nation-state control to one 
where global markets and corporations gained influence (Bernstein, 2013; Greenberg, 2010). 
 
Three notable developments in the South African context were: the signing of the Uruguay 
Round of GATT which led to the formation of the WTO in 1994 and locked countries into trade 
agreements with major implications for systems of production and distribution; the dismantling 
of the statutory regulatory systems governing agricultural and food products and their 
replacement with a combination of greater market forces and industry self-regulation, 
culminating in the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act (MAPA) of 1996; and amendments to 
the Cooperatives Act in 1993, which allowed the cooperative infrastructure to be removed from 
farmer control, and then corporatised and privatised. Combined, these opened the door to 
expansion of corporate power in the South African system. 
 
A consequence of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was that South Africa was required 
to reduce domestic support and open markets to imports in the face of continuing production 
subsidies in the core capitalist countries. South Africa did reduce its tariff barriers significantly, 
sometimes even beyond WTO requirements. Between 2000 and 2003 South Africa had an 
average Producer Subsidy Equivalent1 of 5%, compared to 31% for Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (OECD, 2006:5). This ultimately increased 
imports, placing domestic producers under pressure and encouraging expansion and 
globalisation as ways out of the dilemma. This is what Harvey (2006) refers to as a spatial fix, 
transferring the problem elsewhere but with greater long-term contradictions brewing. The 
WTO AoA meant prices were increasingly influenced by world prices, exchange rates and the 
level of import protection. The latter was to come down as part of the agreement. 
 
In the early 1990s, the government proceeded with the removal of subsidies and liberalisation 
of markets. First the Board of Tariffs and Trade and then the Kassier Committee of Inquiry into 
the Marketing Act (1992) criticised the marketing schemes and recommended the removal of 
statutory interventions. Kassier also argued that the private sector should be responsible for 
regulating production and price instability (Bayley, 2000:44). Full deregulation was sealed with 
the passing of the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act in 1996, which saw the closure of the 
marketing boards and the ending of statutory export monopolies. The Act was based on the 
Kassier Committee’s recommendations. The 1996 Act essentially created a ‘free market’ for 
food. Previously the government had an intricate system of control over food prices, including 
subsidies on bread prices. Food security policy changed in line with the greater emphasis on 
exports and trade. The self-sufficiency policy was replaced by a policy of food self-reliance, 
meaning that trade in food would gain greater importance as a mechanism to acquire sufficient 
food for domestic consumption. The use of trade would be based on considerations of 
comparative and competitive advantage in the national economy as a whole as it integrated into 
the global economy. 
 
Amendments to the Cooperatives Act in 1993 permitted the gradual privatisation of the 
cooperatives. The changes to the Act ensured the cooperatives were able to capture part of the 
massive assets that had been built up over the years and retain them, first for their members 
(Amin and Bernstein, 1996) and later for shareholders. By the mid-1990s the cooperatives were 
handling the vast majority of many of the most important crops and supplying or financing 
major levels of inputs to farmers (Bayley, 2000; 26). Many of them converted into private 
companies. For example, wheat producers and millers cooperatively organised into Sasko and 
                                                             
1 Producer Subsidy Equivalent - the annual monetary transfer to agricultural producers from domestic consumers and 
taxpayers resulting from agricultural policy, based on a formula that takes into account level of production, domestic 
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Bokomo merged under the umbrella of Pioneer Foods, and held one third of the wheat flour 
market in the late 1990s. Cooperatively organised Cape dairy producers formed a company 
called Bonnita in 1992, with Premier Foods buying a majority share in 1994. Premier also 
absorbed Genfood, one of the corporate giants of the past. The cooperatives originally had their 
own provincial/regional spheres of influence, but with corporatisation and privatisation, 
mergers and acquisitions led to a few large national (and then Southern African regional and 
then global) entities. Notable are the former Oos-Transvaal Ko-op (OTK, which became Afgri) 
and Sentraal Wes Ko-op (Senwes) which came to occupy dominant positions in the agro-food 
sector in integrated agricultural services (input supply, storage, logistics, finance, technical 
support) as well as production operations of their own, such as poultry and maize. Other former 
cooperatives, such as VKB (Vrystaat) and NWK (Noord-Wes) are also multi-billion-rand 
corporations today. 
 
3. MAPPING CORPORATE POWER IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTH 
AFRICAN AGRO-FOOD SYSTEM 
This section adopts a loose value chain approach to offer an initial mapping of corporate 
involvement in the agro-food system. That is, the investigation is structured on the basis of 
specific nodes of activity through which a commodity passes and value is added, with a focus on 
companies that operate across multiple commodity chains. Figure 1 provides a rough 
diagrammatic overview of the South African agro-food system, highlighting key corporate actors 
(see Annexure 1 for sources). Figure 2 provides a preliminary quantification of the value of 
different nodes or parts of the agro-food system. The largest node of activity is wholesale and 
retail, followed by food manufacturing and then primary agricultural production. This is total 
value rather than value addition, so it is not surprising that downstream nodes are larger than 
upstream ones. However, it does indicate the relative value under control in each node.  
 
Some nodes tend to be dominated by corporations, for example input supply, grain storage and 
handling, and feedlots for commercial livestock. Other nodes have a strong corporate core but 
there is a far wider periphery, for example primary agricultural production, food manufacturing 
and food wholesale and retail. The latter three are also the largest nodes in the system by value. 
It is important to note that nodes have their own centres of power and control, and also that the 
distribution of power and control in the system varies by commodity. There is no simple story 
of buyer (specifically retail) domination throughout the agro-food system. Seed, fertiliser and 
machinery, for example, seem to be producer-driven in the sense that production innovations 
rather than consumer demands drive change, although there will also be some kind of 
intersection. The relationships between food manufacturers and retailers are also likely to be 
more complex than simply being buyer driven. Innovation is critical to manufacturing 
competitiveness, and this means manufacturers may seek to shape demand by creating ‘new’ 
products rather than merely responding to demand channelled through retailers. 
 
In some parts of the agro-food system there is some vertical integration. Primary agricultural 
production is the main locus of vertically integrated activities. This takes two distinct forms. 
One form is the vertical integration in the grain sector of supply of inputs to primary agriculture, 
agricultural services and grain storage and handling. These activities are dominated by the 
former grain cooperatives, including Afgri (formerly Oos Transvaal Ko-op – OTK), Senwes, NWK 
(formerly Noord-Wes Ko-op), VKB (Vrystaat Ko-op Beperk) and some other smaller regional 
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Figure 1: Schematic overview of South African agro-food system structure 
 
Values indicate sales/turnover in 2014.  
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Figure 2: Preliminary quantification of value in selected nodes and activities in the agro-
food system, 20142 
For sources, see Annexure 1. 
Values are sales/turnover in 2014. 
                                                             
2 Thanks to Dudu Coelho for assistance with the infographic. 
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Privatisation and corporatisation of assets has allowed the former cooperatives to consolidate 
their strength. The one area where the cooperatives used to play a major role, but where their 
role has been reduced since corporatisation and deregulation, is in production finance, with the 
commercial banks taking over the main role. The second form of vertical integration related to 
the primary production node is in certain industrialised activities, including animal feed/ 
poultry and sugar, both of which are integrated downstream with processing/manufacturing. 
Generally, however, supplier contracts are favoured over vertical integration. Fishing is another 
example of vertical integration but is not dealt with systematically in this review. There is also 
value chain integration, especially between retailers and suppliers, but this is not the same as 
vertical integration. Vertical integration is about corporate ownership in more than one node in 
a commodity chain, while value chain integration is about integrating processes throughout a 
chain but not with direct corporate ownership. This is considered in more detail below when 
looking at value chain governance. 
 
Inputs to primary production 
Agricultural inputs are not well mapped in the South African agro-food system. There is some 
data from Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) on expenditure, and the Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) has annual updates on price indices, but not amounts spent. 
There is some work on corporate power in seed, fertiliser and agrochemicals (ACB, 2009). 
Research and development, education and training, and technical and management expertise 
are hidden from outsiders. Further research on these dimensions is required. 
 
Stats SA (2013a) indicates total primary agricultural production expenditure in 2013 at 
R196.4bn, of which current expenditure constituted around 91% and capital expenditure the 
remainder. The latter includes purchases of machinery and vehicles, land, buildings etc. DAFF 
(2015:78) indicates total value of capital assets on commercial farms at R359.1bn in 2014. Total 
current expenditure on farms in 2013 was R178.5bn, divided into inputs R130.1bn (73%), 
animals R27.6bn (15%), and salaries and wages R20.7bn (12%). In turn, major input costs were 
animal feed R26.6bn (20.4% of total); repairs, maintenance and licences R10.2bn (7.7%); 
fertilisers R10bn (7.6%); and fuel R8.3bn (6.4%) (Stats SA, 2013a:7). The largest price increases 
for farming requisites over the past five years were for farm feeds and packing material (DAFF, 
2015:94). 
 
The different inputs have their own dominant corporations. The commercial animal feed sector 
tends to be vertically integrated, especially within the large poultry producers. The Animal Feed 
Manufacturers’ Association (AFMA) has 40 distinct full members3. Major members are Meadow 
Feeds (Astral Foods), Epol and Foodcorp (both RCL Foods), Nutri Feeds (Country Bird), Afgri 
Animal Feeds, Nova Feeds (Quantum), VKB Agriculture, and De Heus (subsidiary of Dutch 
multinational). Grain traders are associate members of AFMA and include Cargill, Seaboard, 
Louis Dreyfus and other multinational operators. Cargill and Louis Dreyfus handle 70% of maize 
trading in South Africa (ACB, 2013:17). 
 
The main ingredients of animal feed are maize (52%), soya oilcake (14%), wheaten bran and 
flour (7%), sunflower seed and oilcake (5%), molasses (4%) with another 47 ingredients 
(AFMA 2015:42–43). Poultry (broilers and layers) is the largest consumer (41%), followed by 
beef and sheep (29%) then dairy (18%) (AFMA 2015:53). South Africa is a net importer of 
animal feeds and raw materials, especially soya oilcake (AFMA 2015:32). There is a rise in soya 
production in South Africa and a corresponding drop in soya oilcake imports, though this 
remains the most significant import for animal feed. For the poultry companies in particular, 
feed is a major source of profit and in recent years has even offset losses in poultry production. 
                                                             
3 http://www.afma.co.za/Membership.htm  
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The vertically integrated companies produce feed for their internal operations as well as for sale 
to others. Animal feed tends to employ far fewer workers than poultry operations. Animal feed 
accounts for a small share of overall revenue produced by the vertically integrated poultry 
producers, but animal feed operations account for most of the operating profit.  
 
Mechanisation can be divided into capital expenditure (which incorporates motor vehicles, 
plant, machinery, tractors and other transport) valued at R11.3bn in 2013; and current 
expenditure (which includes repairs, maintenance and licences) valued at R10.2bn for all assets 
in 2013 (Stats SA, 2013). Domestic and multinational corporations (MNCs) operate as agents 
and after-sales support for mostly imported brands, sometimes with exclusive brand rights in 
South Africa and regionally. Imported agricultural machinery4 was valued at R6.5bn in 2014 
(DTI, 2015). The main imported brands are Massey Ferguson, Claas, Bell, John Deere, Dezzi, 
New Holland and CASE IH. Companies in the market include Afgri, Barloworld Agriculture, Bell 
Equipment, Deere & Co., Agco, Dipla and Landmech. Afgri is the single largest John Deere 
franchise in Africa, with 11 centres in South Africa, two in Zimbabwe, one in Zambia, one in 
Ghana and a John Deere franchise in Australia. It had a 30% South African market share for 
tractors in 2013 (Afgri, 2013). No publicly available work has been done on this sector yet. 
Other companies, such as Unitrans (under KAP Industrial) provide on-farm services, which may 
include leasing of machinery.  
 
As with machinery, a high proportion of fertiliser raw materials and finished products are 
imported. In the mid-2000s all potash and 40–60% of nitrogen was imported, while domestic 
production accounted for around 90% of phosphate (ACB, 2009:49). Fertiliser production 
requires procurement of the raw material inputs with some links to the mining sector, and then 
blending of bulk and specialist fertilisers. The fertiliser industry was built under state 
protection prior to the 1980s, with state-owned enterprises Foskor and Sasol dominant. After 
deregulation the industry was unable to sustain itself, factories were closed and South Africa 
became a net importer of fertiliser from around 2000 (ACB, 2009). Fertiliser imports in 2000 
were valued at R858m, rising rapidly to R7.4bn in 2014 (DTI, 2015). In 2009 the Competition 
Tribunal found Sasol, Omnia and Yara/Kynoch guilty of cartel conduct in the supply of 
nitrogenous fertiliser, and Sasol and Foskor guilty of cartel conduct in the supply of phosphoric 
acid. Sasol had to pay a fine of R250m (Competition Tribunal, 2009). Sasol was also ordered to 
divest itself of certain assets. Little work has been done since the late 2000s to track changes 
and consolidation in the industry since then. The main companies are Sasol, Foskor and Omnia. 
All of them operate as multinationals. For Sasol, a very large petro-chemical company, fertiliser 
production is a small side business. Kynoch was the fertiliser market leader with an estimated 
market share of 40% in 19995, but with an unknown share now. Yara owned Kynoch between 
2005 and 2009, and the brand was taken off the market. Yara withdrew from the South African 
market after the Competition Tribunal ruling, and Kynoch is now under the ownership of East 
African multinational Export Trading Group.  
 
Seed is included in Figures 1 and 2 mainly because it is an important input where corporate 
power is very concentrated, especially in grains but also other seed. This is important for 
specific commodities such as maize, wheat and vegetables. Maize seed constituted 57% of the 
total seed market in 2014 (see Annexure 1). Pioneer Hi Bred/Pannar and Monsanto are the 
biggest corporations, having acquired the largest domestic companies after deregulation 
(Monsanto with Sensako and Carnia 1999–2000, and Du Pont Pioneer Hi-Bred with the 
acquisition of Pannar in 2012). The largest remaining domestic company is Zaad which 
incorporates Agricol and Klein Karoo Seed, owned by Zeder (see Figure 5), while the public (but 
corporatised) Agricultural Research Council holds significant plant breeders’ rights (ACB, 
                                                             
4 This includes specifically agricultural machinery, but not agriculture’s share of general purpose machinery, e.g. transport, 
forklifts, graders, etc. 
5 http://www.m2.com/m2/web/story.php/1999801D6F12A66C32B9802568560041FEB3  
 
 
Working paper 32, Stephen Greenberg 9 
2009). Pioneer Hi-Bred/Pannar, Klein Karoo and Monsanto owned 62% of registered maize 
seed varieties in 2013 (ACB, 2013:17). 
 
Farm finance is treated as a separate input – it is not a current input – and was valued at 
R116.6bn in 2014 (DAFF, 2015:79) of which commercial banks held 56% of the total loan book 
and the Land Bank 30%. Deregulation saw a sharp shift in the loan book from cooperatives and 
the Land Bank to the commercial banks. The Land Bank experienced major internal problems in 
the 1990s and early 2000s but in recent years has steadily recouped its share of the loan book. 
 
Retail input supply and wider agri-services are another poorly documented realm. Agri-services 
is a very broad term, ranging from insurance to retail input sales to on-farm contracting 
services, including labour broking. The former cooperatives tend to be dominant in input 
delivery and agri-services, based on their historical areas of operation. Afgri, Senwes and NWK 
are dominant, with a number of partnerships and joint ventures between them. A trend is the 
move towards on-farm contract services, with logistics and agri-services corporations such as 
Unitrans and Afgri involved in such activities. For example, Unitrans’ agricultural sub-division is 
involved in contracted load and haul services, harvesting, land preparation, bush clearing, 
infrastructure development and estate ancillary services (KAP Industrial 2014:37). 
 
Logistics 
Logistics is a key factor throughout the system. Here the focus is narrowly on the organisation 
and coordination of the movement of the commodity through the supply chain, with supply 
chain governance dealt with in more detail later in the report. Supply is structured around 
nodes with production networks that may consist of thousands of suppliers radiating from them 
(Sturgeon, 2000). The primary objective is the supply of the right input at the right time in the 
right quantity for continuous production, with secondary objectives of resource use efficiency, 
integration of business processes along the supply chain, and cost and efficiency of supply and 
flow of materials from source to destination. These are related to corporate concentration and 
the emphasis on meeting returns on investment targets (Aglietta and Reberioux, 2005). 
Shareholders exert pressure to reduce costs every year and this flows through the supply chain. 
Logistics functions include supply chain and network design, freight forwarding and clearing, 
transport, warehouse design and optimisation, warehousing and storage, inventory 
management, integration services, distribution and fulfilment, and demand management.  
 
Logistics tends to deal with planning and physical movement of products between nodes in 
commodity chains, but there are also technical coordination and resource flow functions within 
production units, especially in primary agriculture and food manufacturing. Within the 
production unit, supply chain management (which shades into line management on the shop 
floor) refers to coordination of the physical functions of production, incorporating technical 
knowledge and its application in practical production, including work process and labour 
organisation, and the coordination and organisational functions to ensure the correct 
sequencing and flow of throughputs. It links in to broader supply chain management through 
the input and output interfaces, where it may become part of a longer coordinated chain.  
 
A recent trend is towards integrated supply systems. End-to-end integration of supply chain 
functions is considered the next major shift required to retain competitiveness (CSIR, 2013:ii). 
Integrated systems drive down excess buffer stock and associated costs. Revolutionary 
advances in ICT, as indicated above, have facilitated and enabled real-time sharing of 
information, flexible specialisation in production, materials and resource planning and flows, 
and ‘customer relationship management’ and data mining to predict and shape customer 
demand (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001:94–95). South Africa tends to lag behind these 
developments; in particular South African companies still operate in silos with supply chains 
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designed for individual companies, rather than throughout the chain. The emphasis is on 
‘financial functionality’ (cost) rather than supply chain integration requirements (CSIR, 
2013:18). Information latency (time lags in transmitting supply, demand and financial data 
between supply chain partners) is a key obstacle to demand-driven supply chains in South 
Africa (CSIR, 2013:19–20). 
 
Two main areas of logistics are farm to factory (primary freight) and factory to wholesale/retail 
(secondary freight). These may include cold chains, which benefit from an integrated modular 
approach so the chain is unbroken. Primary freight (including forestry) was valued at R10.2bn 
in 2014, while secondary freight (including beverages and tobacco) was valued at R15.1bn 
(Stats SA 2014, 2014a, 2015a). Further work will need to be commodity specific. For now we 
are looking broadly at companies with significant agro-food logistics operations across 
commodities wherever they operate in the system. These include both outsourced operators, 
like Bidvest or Imperial, and in-house operations, like most of the retailers and manufacturers 
have. Logistics may be a split responsibility between seller and buyer and this will be subject to 
contracts and partnerships, as well as struggles for control. Overall there is likely to be some 
dynamic mix of outsourcing and in-house operations. 
 
In South Africa, rail historically dominated freight and logistics through the state-owned South 
African Transport Services (later Transnet). After deregulation there was a rapid shift to road 
transport for flexibility and cost reasons (CSIR, 2013). Transnet still plays a role, but agro-food 
products are a relatively small component of its total freight. Total freight tonnage in 2012 was 
88% by road and just 12% by rail, of which 57% was bulk mining. Thus only around 5% of non-
mining freight was by rail in 2012 (CSIR, 2013:40). Major freight products for Transnet are 
mining, general freight (which includes agriculture amongst many others) and petroleum. 
General freight accounted for around 35% of total revenue in 2014 (Transnet, 2014:6). 
 
There is a good national road network but decaying provincial infrastructure, including damage 
from trucks carrying ‘rail-friendly’ cargo (CSIR, 2013:iii). Efforts are being made to shift freight back 
to rail. This is more ecologically friendly, but remains inflexible (e.g. containers must be full before 
they can move) and costly. There are some joint ventures or public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
between Transnet and some of the main private logistics companies, including Barloworld, Imperial 
and Unitrans (CSIR, 2013:66) on integrated inter-modality (CSIR 2013:45). 
 
The biggest logistics and transport corporations operating in South Africa are diversified across 
a number of economic fields, e.g. mining, industrial manufacture and food products. Agriculture 
and fast-moving consumer goods are a smaller component of the businesses, and the share is 
difficult to extract from the available information. The largest companies operating in the sector 
appear to be Bidvest, Imperial and Barloworld, with Unitrans (subsidiary of KAP Industrial) also 
active on a smaller scale, but more investigation is required to map their activities in the agro-
food system specifically. In 2014 Bidvest agro-food turnover was R6.6bn, but this was less than 
4% of the corporation's total turnover that year. 
 
Bidvest is by far the largest by market capitalisation but a significant portion of its operations 
are outside South Africa. Bidvest offers a different example of integration to the standard 
vertical integration between nodes of production. It is a diversified services corporation that 
has grown rapidly in the past few years, primarily through acquisitions of independently-owned 
businesses in many service sectors. As a result it operates in a number of areas with an impact 
on the agro-food system, including fast-moving consumer goods, freight and logistics, 
packaging, financial services and foodservice. However, this is not the same as vertically 
integrated production, where the corporation operates in two or more nodes of a specific 
commodity chain with supply of products and services flowing within the vertically integrated 
company for value addition. 
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Imperial Holdings (2014:56) notes trends in logistics that include a growth in outsourcing of 
logistics (especially transport, storage, distribution and operations planning); consolidation in 
the retail supply chain and rationalisation of logistics services provider capacity; and increased 
engagement by business on their inbound supply chains (transport efficiencies, reduced 
inventories, integrated planning). Outsourcing of logistics, including planning is fairly common, 
which is quite surprising given the centrality of control over the supply chain. Companies 
outsourcing logistics may opt to go with one large operator or may prefer to reduce dependency 
on a single service provider and distribute the activities amongst a number of smaller suppliers, 
where the lead firm will have greater control over the process and more flexibility. 
 
On the other hand, several agro-food corporations, especially in manufacturing and distribution, 
have in-house logistics divisions that perform these functions but may also sell logistics and 
transport services to other companies. An example is RCL Foods with Vector Logistics, which 
provides in-house services to Foodcorp, Rainbow and TSB, and also provides primary 
warehousing and transport, principal secondary distribution (to retailers, wholesalers and 
general trade) and customer secondary distribution (a full basket of products directly to 
customer outlets) to many clients, ranging from I&J in fisheries to Pick n Pay in retail, and most 
of the large consumer food service outlets (RCL Foods, 2014:12-13). Pioneer Foods and AVI 
also have centralised procurement and logistics. Retailers have their own distribution fleets. 
 
Wholesalers and retailers are at the forefront of supply chain management innovations, copying 
Walmart’s globally successful operations. Walmart’s supply chain innovations are based on 
centralised distribution; tight supply chain management built around new ICTs and computing 
power; data mining and analysis to forecast demand; and global sourcing and the elimination or 
redistribution of supply chain functions to transfer less profitable activities to suppliers and to 
absorb more profitable activities, including direct sourcing where it is profitable/cost saving to 
do so (Wulfraat, 2011; Mack, 2012). Consumers are recruited as allies to force down prices in 
the supply chain. Local retailers have adopted these and other global innovations in supply 
chain management over the past decade. Early adoption of centralised distribution permitted 
Shoprite to expand market share, and late adoption resulted in Pick n Pay falling behind in the 
competitive race (Thomas, 2011). This shades into value chain governance, which is dealt with 
in a bit more detail later. 
Primary agricultural production 
Commercial agricultural production was valued at R208.3bn in 2013/14. To this we can add an 
estimated R15.5bn6 in subsistence or informal market production that is not taken into account 
in DAFF statistics (Aliber and Mdoda, 2014). There are three broad areas of primary agricultural 
production: animal production (46.3% of gross value in 2013/14), field crops (28%) and 
horticulture (25.6%) (see Table 2).   
 
In line with the replication of the US national agricultural model in the era of state-led 
development, South Africa has a grain-livestock complex (GLC) at the heart of the agro-food 
system. Poultry (meat and eggs combined) products were valued at R41.8bn in 2014, cattle 
(meat and milk combined) had a value of R35.4bn and maize had a value of R27.2bn. Combined 
these constituted R104.4bn or 50% of the total value of commercial primary production in 
2014. Beyond this, the GLC extends upstream, where animals purchased and animal feed alone 
had a combined value of R54.2bn in 2014 (see above); and where maize is the major 
commercial seed type, the sector uses a large share of fertiliser and machinery, etc. 
Downstream, the GLC extends into grain storage and handling, processing and further value 
addition, and also has numerous connections into other agricultural products (e.g. soya and 
molasses from sugar into animal feed). 
                                                             
6 Estimated R13bn in 2010/11, increased by 6% per year for a 2013/14 figure. 
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Table 2: Primary agricultural production in South Africa, 2013/14* 













Animal production R96.4 46.3 Fowls slaughtered R32.9 34.1 
  Cattle and calves slaughtered R22.7 23.5 
  Fresh milk R12.7 13.2 
  Eggs R8.9 9.2 
Field crops R58.5 28.0 Maize R27.2 46.5 
  Sugar cane R7.9 13.5 
  Wheat R5.4 9.2 
  Soya beans R5.2 8.9 
Horticulture R53.3 25.6 Deciduous and other fruit R14.0 26.3 
  Vegetables R11.1 20.8 
  Citrus fruit R9.7 18.2 
  Potatoes R6.3 11.8 
Total production R208.3 100    
Source: DAFF, 2015:75–76 
*preliminary 
 
While statistics on subsistence and smallholder agriculture are woefully inadequate, it is 
estimated that there were around 2.5 million households practising some kind of agriculture in 
2013. Roughly 2.3 million of these were black households engaged in subsistence production 
(i.e. who farm for an extra or main source of food), and 167 000 were smallholder households 
(i.e. who farm for a main or extra source of income) (Aliber and Mdoda, 2014:1). To this we can 
add somewhere around 40 000 large-scale commercial producers, according to the 2007 Census 
of Agriculture (Stats SA, 2010:10). This was the last time a survey on commercial agriculture 
was conducted and the information is hopelessly out of date. But even if the data is somewhat 
questionable, it is fairly evident that the numbers of commercial farmers have been declining 
since deregulation. 
 
There appears to be some concentration in commercial agricultural production. Despite a 
decline in farmer numbers, the area under production has not shrunk to the same extent, 
indicating consolidation. Liebenberg (2013:28) indicates just 0.6% of commercial farming units 
(237 units) accounted for a third of income in 2007. This can be compared with the top 5% of 
farms accounting for 10% of income in 1993. Also using 2007 Census of Agricultur data, Kirsten 
(2011) indicated that 57% of commercial farmers had an annual gross income of R500 000 or 
less, and just 7% of all commercial farm units had a gross income of R5 million or more. 
Nevertheless, direct corporate ownership of primary production is not pronounced and, where 
it exists, is decidedly uneven. Corporate power in primary production expresses itself more in 
supply chain control than in direct production. There are particular locations in the primary 
production process where corporate producers are dominant, for example in cattle feedlots and 
poultry production. However, contract or open market arrangements are more common, as 
these allow for a wider supply base that mitigates the production risk for large buyers. 
Individual farmers or farmer partnerships may be very powerful in local areas or regions, 
though they are less so on a national scale, with some exceptions (e.g. ZZ2 in vegetables, or wine 
farmers). More detail can be provided, based on commodity-specific analysis. 
 
Increasing economies of scale are a driving force in commercial agriculture. Deregulation and 
trade liberalisation have opened the space for global competitors who either have lower cost 
structures or who can rely on government subsidies to land their products at cheaper costs than 
local producers. According to Bernstein (2013:26) ‘the largest enterprises are generally in 
areas of high agricultural productivity, and are major field crop producers, irrigated and export-
oriented horticulture enterprises or intensive livestock enterprises. Most operate on more than 
one non-contiguous farm and sometimes on rented land too’. The result is growing 
differentiation amongst commercial farmers and the deployment of a range of strategies of 
 
 
Working paper 32, Stephen Greenberg 13 
diversification and consolidation, including buying or renting more land, diversifying operations 
on their present property, exploring different markets in search of higher product prices, 
seeking to enlarge income and cost margins by improving productivity and increasing yields, 
and movement up the value chain (Genis, 2015). Other trends are towards part-time 
production, and diversification into other economic activities alongside agricultural production. 
 
A recent trend in commercial agriculture is encroaching financialisation (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 
2015), with diverse fund managers shaping farmland and agricultural infrastructure as an 
investment opportunity. Systems for reducing the risk of commodity volatility include the use of 
the futures exchange (SAFEX), silo receipts, multi-risk crop insurance, and geographical and 
asset diversification (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2015:8).  
 
Aggregation and primary processing are intermediate between primary agricultural production 
and downstream nodes in chains. This is commodity specific and is best dealt with in 
commodity analyses. There is concentrated activity specifically in feedlots for cattle, grain 
storage and handling in grains, and grading and packing in horticulture. These activities are 
performed on the farm or in the farming area. In livestock, 75% of cattle go through 
concentrated feedlots before reaching the market. A core of large producers dominate these 
feedlots, including Karan Beef, Bull Brand/Kolosus, EAC Group and Sparta Beef, which between 
them had a 54% market share in 2010 (Spies, 2010:82). Kanhym Estates is dominant in pig 
feedlots. Vertically integrated poultry producers include Astral Foods, Rainbow (RCL Foods), 
Afgri, Country Bird, Quantum Foods and Sovereign Foods. Vertically integrated industrial 
poultry production concentrates production in feedlots from the beginning of the process. 
 
In grain storage and handling, 17 large owners held 94% of the silo market, and Senwes, Afgri 
and NWK had 74% of grain silo capacity in 2011 (DAFF, 2012a). Senwes has around 25% of 
commercial storage capacity, and handles approximately 20% of the country’s grain and 
oilseeds7 and nearly 30% of all grain (Senwes, 2014:7). Afgri had an approximate 25% silo 
market share at the time of its acquisition by AgriGroupe (Competition Tribunal, 2014:5). No 
systematic work has been done to date on mapping out preliminary processing and packing in 
horticulture. Facilities tend to be decentralised under the control of local farmer partnerships, 
rather than national-scale agribusiness control. There may be some commodity-specific 
concentration, for example ZZ2 in tomatoes. This requires further investigation. 
 
Food manufacturing 
The focus here is specifically on food manufacturing rather than broader agro-processing. DAFF 
divides agro-processing into 11 sub-divisions8. Agro-processing is the largest single 
manufacturing branch in South Africa, at an average 29% of total manufacturing value from 
2006–2010. Food (42%) and beverages (12%) in turn are the two largest sub-divisions within 
agro-processing (DAFF, 2012:5). By DAFF’s figures, food constituted an average of around 12% 
of the total value of manufacturing in South Africa between 2006 and 2010, showing a slight but 
not major declining share of total manufacturing since the mid-1980s. 
 
Stats SA valued food and beverages manufacturing sales at R391.9bn in 2014: beverages 
R107.2bn (27%); ‘meat, fish, fruit etc.’ R105bn (27%); grain mill products R64.1bn (16.4%); 
dairy R34bn (8.7%); and other food products R81.6bn (20.8%) (Stats SA, 2015:11). The 
packaged food market was valued at R172.4bn in 2014 (Euromonitor 2015d). This is about 44% 
of the total food and beverages market. South Africa had a positive trade balance in processed 
food in 2014 (see section on trade below).  
                                                             
7 http://www.senwes.co.za/en-ZA/Corporate/  
8 Food, beverages, paper and paper products, wood and wood products, textiles, wearing apparel, furniture, tobacco, 
rubber products, footwear, and leather and leather products. 
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Table 3: Income in formal food and beverage manufacturing sector by enterprise size, 2011 
Enterprise size Turnover Share of total income 
Large >R104m 88.3% 
Medium R24m-R104m 7.5% 
Small R12m-R24m 2.3% 
Micro <R12m 1.9% 
Source: Stats SA 2011:22 
 
Deregulation in the 1990s led to increasing processing opportunities, especially in baking, dairy, 
milling and meat production (Mather, 2005:611), but income has remained very concentrated 
(Table 3). Deregulation has simultaneously led to a decline in employment in agro-processing 
and food manufacturing. Employment in agro-processing peaked in 1996 and subsequently 
dropped continuously to 2010, from an annual average of 720 000 (1996–2000) to 594 000 
(2006–2010), with employment in food manufacturing dropping from an annual average of 
230 000 (1996–2000) to 186 000 (2006–2010), a 19% decline (DAFF, 2012:11–12).  
 
This report focuses on general food manufacturers and excludes beverages and commodity-
specific food manufacturers, especially in sugar, dairy and poultry, where large corporations are 
dominant. These are the subject of commodity-specific analyses. In 2011, sugar, fish and 
beverages were the most concentrated sectors, followed closely by oils and fats, grain mill 
products and starches, and bakery products. In all these sectors, the five largest companies had 
a combined formal market share of 75% or more (Stats SA 2011:23). Commodity-specific 
companies that we should keep an eye on are Tongaat Hulett, Illovo and RCL/TSB in sugar; 
Clover, Parmalat, Danone and Dairybelle in dairy; and Astral and RCL/Rainbow with Quantum, 
Country Bird and Sovereign Foods as smaller entities in poultry. Consolidation in the poultry 
industry can be anticipated as companies struggle with profitability. 
 
The largest listed general food manufacturers were Tiger Brands, with a market capitalisation of 
R58.7bn in 2014; Pioneer Foods at R41.3bn; AVI at R28.6bn and RCL Foods at R16bn (Financial 
Mail, 2015). Alongside these, we can include the two largest non-South African multinationals, 
Nestlé and Unilever. Both of these have larger operations in South Africa than RCL Foods, which 
incorporates Foodcorp, a general food manufacturer, along with Rainbow Chicken and TSB in 
sugar production. Premier Foods is also a smaller general food manufacturer that was acquired 
by Brait and delisted (see Figure 5). Between them Tiger Brands, Premier Foods and Pioneer 
Foods accounted for 60% of white maize milling in 2013 (ACB, 2013:17). Top maize brands are 
White Star super maize meal (Pioneer) with a 25.3% market share in 2012, Ace super maize 
meal (Tiger Brands) with 22.5%, and Iwisa (Premier Foods) with 13.3% (but 25.5% together 
with Premier’s other brands, Impala and Nyala) (ACB, 2013:37–38). More details on maize will 
require a dedicated commodity study. 
 
Table 4 shows the companies with the largest market share in general packaged food/food 
manufacturing. According to Euromonitor, the top five packaged food manufacturers have 
34.3% of the packaged food market; however this excludes maize and sugar. There is also some 
question about how Euromonitor arrived at their statistics. In particular, the figure that 
Euromonitor gives for Tiger Brands packaged food sales is the same as the figure Tiger Brands 
gives in its 2014 annual report for total turnover, including all non-food operations and maize 
products. The company indicates that just 30% of its revenue comes from consumer food 
products, which significantly reduces Tiger Brand’s market share to around 5.2% of the 
packaged food market. This is about the same size as Pioneer Foods. This seems more realistic 
when you consider the similar revenues from their respective food businesses in 2014 (Table 
4). Regardless of these details, the largest corporations are Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods, Nestlé, 
AVI and Unilever. 
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Table 4: The Big 5 general packaged food manufacturers, 2014 
 Tiger Brands Pioneer Foods Nestlé AVI Unilever 
Controlling shareholders Institutions/PIC 49% foreign Zeder Institutions Institutions * 
Market capitalisation R57.3bn R41.6bn  R27.2bn  
Group revenue/turnover R30.1bn R17.7bn  R10.3bn  
Group operating profit9 R3.7bn R1.7bn  R1.7bn  
SA food business 
revenue** R18.9bn R17.7bn R7.4bn R7.6bn R6.2bn 
SA food business 
operating profit** R2.7bn R1.6bn  R1.16bn  
Packaged food market 
share*** 
17.4% 














2 783 contract) 
3 500 
Sources: Annual reports, 2014; market capitalisation – Financial Mail, 2015 
*Blank cells indicate information that is not provided in available reports. **Including in-house logistics ***Euromonitor, 
2015d – excludes packaged maize and sugar products ****Adjustments to Tiger Brands’ market share (discussion in text) 
 
According to the information from annual reports and websites, the top five general food 
manufacturers in South Africa had food revenues of about R57.8bn in 2014 – only around 14% 
of the total market, according to figures from Stats SA (2015). This amount includes some 
logistics performed in-house or even as commercial operations for other clients, as well as some 
beverages. This seems to be a fairly low market share but we must remember we are excluding 
commodity-specific lines, especially sugar, dairy, poultry and fishing, which have their own 
dominant corporations. Retailers have also encroached into the manufacturing space through 
private labels, although these may still be manufactured by the big corporates (see below). In 
addition, many of the estimated more than 4 000 food production companies (Madima, 2006) 
will produce intermediate goods that find a market amongst the big corporations. Madima says 
the top 10 corporations account for 70% of total turnover, which does not match the figures 
above. However, this probably refers to turnover of JSE listed companies, since Madima also 
shows market concentration on the JSE, so this may be his frame of reference. 
 
The low percentage share of the large corporations that we see all about us seems counter-
intuitive, and begs the question of who is producing all the rest. But these figures come from the 
corporations themselves and are matched to official government data on size of the overall 
sector. The important questions are: How wide is the food manufacturing periphery, and what 
are some of its key features? Mather (2005) surveyed 30 small and medium food processing 
companies, but the survey was more about conditions current at the time than about trying to 
quantify the sector. A key feature was efforts to access retail supply chains. 
 
Key trends and dynamics in food manufacturing include consumer markets under pressure, 
which are forcing manufacturers to adapt. Markets are smaller and manufacturers are forced to 
look elsewhere to maintain growth. This leads to multinationalisation (see below) in an effort to 
secure other spaces for exchange and profit. Supply chain management and demand forecasting 
are critical issues, as are product and process innovations and the ability to respond rapidly to 
changing buyer requirements. These are fast-moving consumer goods, and agility and flexibility 
are required to keep pace. These are means to find advantage in creating and securing new 
markets. The global trend is towards mega-concentration (e.g. AB InBev’s recently accepted 
offer of around US$106bn (around R1.4 trillion) to acquire SABMiller, the third largest 
corporate merger in history; or the failed efforts by Monsanto to acquire rival Syngenta in 2015. 
                                                             
9 Operating income and operating profit are used interchangeably - net revenues minus reported operating expenses, cost of 
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South African agro-food capital is becoming increasingly woven into this global web and 
compelled by global conditions. We should anticipate the large-scale external absorption of 
South African agro-food MNCs as all sectors of the economy consolidate globally. 
 
Wholesale and retail 
Wholesale and retail are treated as one, since they both deal with post-manufacturing 
distribution to end consumers or intermediaries. Hybrid wholesale-retail models are growing 
more prevalent in the corporate sector. The value of the total food wholesale and retail market 
was estimated at R519.4bn in 2014 in a report for the United States Department of Agriculture 
(Ogando, 2014). ‘Traditional’ grocery retailers and independent small grocer sales were valued 
at R291.5bn (56%) and ‘modern’ food retail sales (mainly supermarkets, but also hypermarkets, 
convenience stores and discounters) were valued at R227.9bn (44%) (Figure 2; Annexure 1). 
This unexpected finding is discussed further below. 
The broad periphery 
The broad periphery is defined here in the same way as Euromonitor’s ‘traditional’ markets 
(small grocers, spaza shops, street traders, etc.), also known generally as the informal sector, 
though it shades into the formal sector, especially with the small grocers. Ogondo (2014) 
indicates a 56% share of the total food market, a larger share than ‘modern’ retailers. It is 
difficult to compare this directly with Euromonitor data we have at hand, because the latter 
splits retail into a number of categories – grocery retailers and mixed retailers are most relevant 
for food – without distinguishing between food and non-food products as discussed below. 
Euromonitor data (2015) says 46% of the grocery retail market is through traditional grocery 
retailers (R216.8bn), but that doesn’t include mixed retailers. For mixed retailers, no 
‘traditional’ share is indicated but there are many hybrid forms, including warehouse clubs and 
mass merchandisers that blur the boundaries (Euromonitor, 2015a). 
 
Whichever way we look at it, even a 46% market share is very significant and warrants further 
attention. At the moment, this sector is treated as secondary and often considered a backward 
system in need of modernisation. But even in the face of a rampant corporate retail sector this 
diversity of distribution remains a central feature of the agro-food system. The idea that the 
informal or small could be similar, or even larger, in monetary terms than the formal is very 
significant because it suggests that, while corporate retailers have concentrated market power, 
exercised in ways that go beyond just direct market share, there is also a wide base of economic 
activity beyond the corporations. Retailers are aware of this periphery and have moved 
aggressively into this space in the past two decades. Massmart, for example, has explicitly 
identified small independent retailers as a competitive threat (Massmart, 2014:17). 
 
Euromonitor (2015) indicates more than 81 000 outlets outside the ‘modern’ (mainly 
supermarket) sector. Outlets include formal and informal channels for the ‘retail’ distribution of 
food to consumers. Earlier studies estimated 400 000 hawkers/spaza shops in the mid-2000s 
(Ligthelm, 2006), which obviously can’t refer to the same categories because it is five times the 
amount estimated by Euromonitor above. This would place the number of street traders and 
spaza shops at hundreds or even thousands per district, playing a critical role in distributing 
food where it is needed, even if they often are a conduit for corporate products, too. Wills 
(2009:3) estimated 500 000 street vendors were active in 2007, of whom 72% were women. 
 
According to W&RSETA (2011:5) consumers shop at smaller outlets due to: price, location/ 
convenience, speciality products, customer service, clean stores and knowledge/expertise. Price 
is related more to perceived value than to the cheapest option available. Small stores receive 
word-of-mouth referral, based on quality, service, pricing and product differentiation. Smaller 
storekeepers see technology as having value in streamlining processes, improving turnaround 
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time, decreasing costs and building customer databases. Tailoring their offerings and 
specialisation were considered vital for independent retailers to thrive (W&RSETA, 2011:6). 
 
Most people access food from the formal and informal systems, so these are complementary 
rather than exclusive (Crush and Frayne, 2010). The ‘relatively high density of informal and 
independent food retail channels contribute to a field of choice’ (Aliber & Mdoda, 2014) for poor 
consumers. In 2004 10% of food retail expenditure, more than a quarter of alcoholic beverage 
expenditure and more than a fifth of cigarette and tobacco expenditure were in the informal 
sector (Ligthelm, 2006a:42). Hawkers/street markets accounted for 20% of household 
expenditure in the informal economy, spaza shops 17%, and shebeens 8% (Ligthelm, 2006a:43). 
 
Euromonitor (2015b) calculated total retail employment of 1.11 million in 2014. Between them 
the big five corporate retailers (Table 3) employed around 285 00010 people in all operations 
(including outside South Africa) in 2014. This signifies an estimated minimum 825 000 people 
working outside this corporate core in South Africa (because some of the corporate 
employment is outside South Africa). Earlier studies estimated employment generated by 
hawkers at around 415 000 and spaza shops 320 300 (Ligthelm, 2006a:45). These various 
figures suggest an ongoing importance of this so-called ‘informal’ sector, which is 
underestimated in policy and channelling of support. 
 
However, the actors in this periphery are fragmented, unlike corporate retail where the actors 
are large, consolidated and centralised units that can exert much more direct influence over the 
market through deliberate action. Smaller retailers face difficulties in competing with modern 
grocery retailers, including franchises, and could be forced into niche markets to survive. 
Alternatively, they could constitute an additional outlet for corporate products and processes, 
i.e. incorporation into/extension of corporate value chains. This is a role they already play to 
some extent. The Competition Commission (2015) argues that shopping centre development 
has caused a decrease in the number of small, informal and independent retailers, and a decline 
in their profits and profitability (2015:3). The Commission argues that this is likely to have an 
adverse effect on employment, income levels and the spread of ownership (2015:4) and is 
launching an investigation on this. Despite these threats it is expected that traditional grocery 
retailers will continue to be a key channel in South Africa’s retail environment, especially 
township markets (Euromonitor, 2015b:19). Deeper analysis of the large periphery is taken up 
in related CoE-FS research. 
The corporate core 
The terms ‘grocery retailers’, ‘modern retail’ and the like are derived from Euromonitor, on 
whose data we rely. Euromonitor (2015a) indicates a ‘modern retail’ share of 54% of the 
‘grocery retail’ market, noting this excludes other retailer categories. Spaza shops and other 
small and informal distribution outlets are incorporated into the definition of grocery retailers, 
though the extent is unclear. Corporate retailers placed in this category are Shoprite, Pick n Pay 
and Spar. It is taken that these are primarily, but not exclusively food and non-food grocery 
products. But grocery retail is not the only channel through which food commodities are 
exchanged. There are also mixed retailers – including Massmart and Woolworths, in 
Euromonitor’s categorisation – who sell groceries alongside a significant portion of other 
products (e.g. homeware, apparel, electronics, furniture and even financial services). Mixed 
retailers incorporate warehouse clubs, mass merchandisers, variety stores and department 
stores. So in the data the markets and channels are separated out but the food components of 
each are not.  
  
                                                             
10 Including franchises for Pick n Pay but excluding franchises for Spar. 
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Table 5: The big five food wholesalers/retailers, 2014 
 Shoprite Pick n Pay Massmart Spar Woolworths 







Market share (modern 
grocery retail) 36.1% 25.5% * 18.7%  
Market capitalisation R94.1bn R35.3bn** R29.9bn R32.7bn R87.5bn 
Group revenue R102.2bn R64.2bn R78.3bn R55bn R39.9bn 
Trading/operating 
profit*** R5.7bn R1.0bn R2.0bn R1.9bn R3.9bn 
SA supermarket 
revenue/turnover R76.9bn    R19.2bn 
SA supermarket operating 
profit R4.5bn    R1.3bn**** 
Employees 123 100 (87% in SA) 
49 300 plus 
23,000 franchise 47 209 4 025 
38 855 
(73% in SA) 
Distribution centre m2 
(000) 600 141 328 237 - 
Sources: Annual reports, 2014; Financial Mail, 2015; Euromonitor, 2015, 2015a 2015b 
*Blank cells indicate this information is not provided in available reports. **Pick n Pay Stores plus Pick n Pay Holdings 
***Different reporting formats, but usually trading and operating profits are close to one another ****Profit before tax 
 
Modern food retail (which is taken to incorporate both large grocery and mixed retailers) was 
valued at R227.9bn in 2014, or 44% of the total market. Supermarkets constituted 80% of this 
value, with the rest divided between hypermarkets, convenience stores and discounters 
(Ogando, 2014). According to Retailer News (2015), fresh produce constituted around 36% of 
total food retail, dry goods around 30%, beverages 20% and perishables 14%. 
 
The five big food retailers in South Africa are also the five largest retailers across all sectors: in 
order, Shoprite, Pick n Pay, Spar, Massmart and Woolworths (Table 5). Between them they hold 
a third of the total retail market (food and non-food) (Euromonitor, 2015). In 2014 Shoprite had 
a market capitalisation of R94.1bn; Woolworths R87.5bn; Pick n Pay Stores plus Pick n Pay 
Holdings R35.5bn; Spar R32.7bn; and Massmart R29.9bn. This reflects the capitalisation of each 
entire company including non-food and offshore operations, and not only their food business. 
Specifically food business data is not provided in annual reports or other public sources. 
 
We discussed the challenges with categorising food retailers above. Further challenges are lack 
of precise information about food markets. There are a few general comments we can make 
about the big five food retailers as a group. First, they had a combined profit (including but not 
limited to food) of R14.5bn in 2014. This is almost three times the profit of the top five food 
manufacturers. Follow-up work will need to include identifying how profit is constructed and 
reported, because it definitely excludes large management salaries and options, as well as 
corporate facilities, buildings, perks, etc., all of which run into the billions. Profits also refer only 
to those which are declared in South Africa.  
 
There are different distribution models, including corporate stores, franchises and wholesaling. 
Shoprite and Pick n Pay operate a combination of corporate (owned) and franchise stores, 
Massmart and Spar focus on wholesale and wholesale-retail hybrids, while Woolworths focuses 
on corporate stores. Retailers also target different market segments, with Shoprite and 
Massmart emphasising the lower and middle segments, Spar and Pick n Pay aspiring to span all 
segments, and Woolworths targeting the higher end of the market. However, all retailers are 
under pressure, from their competitors and cash-strapped consumers, to offer lower prices. 
Economies of scale are the order of the day for the mass market. Premium niche markets are 
also available at the upper end, where price is less of a concern. The sector is very competitive, 
with ongoing product and process innovations, together with suppliers, in a continuous quest 
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for efficiency and cost savings, and in-store design and formatting innovations being adopted to 
find a competitive advantage.  
 
Some key trends in food retail include product diversification beyond groceries; multi-channel 
approaches to reaching consumers; in-store financial services, including the distribution of 
social grants; larger format stores, including hypermarkets and mall expansion; format 
diversification, such as forecourts and convenience stores; and mining of customer data 
(gathered, for example, through loyalty programmes and data-sharing agreements) to shape 
supply and demand. Woolworths (2014:86) indicates a trend in its own operations towards 
fewer, more strategic food suppliers, many with exclusivity arrangements for private label 
products. Euromonitor (2015e:38) notes private label penetration of packaged food. A few 
years ago, private labels stood at around 12–15% of market share, and are an increasingly 
significant player in the retail space (SGE, 2013:33). Expansion of private label products allows 
retailers to take control of branding, a profit centre in the era of intellectual property rights. 
 
There is also a trend towards partnerships between retailers and property developers in the 
development and financing of malls and shopping centres. This introduces urban property 
markets into the equation. Retail property (shopping centres, etc.) is a significant node of wealth 
creation in the agro-food system (Figure 2; Annexure 1), with listed domestic retail property 
portfolios valued at R117.7bn in 2014 (Financial Mail, 2015a). Work on these and other 
elements could be expanded as requirements dictate. 
 
Food service and other channels to the consumer 
Food service refers to food prepared outside the home that may be consumed at home or 
outside the home. It includes consumer food service that is direct to consumer: restaurants, fast 
food, street foods, hospitality (hotels, etc.), and institutional food service, which involves 
companies that prepare food for sale via an intermediary, e.g. hospitality, public institutions 
(schools, hospitals, prisons, military, etc.), canteens and other catering operations for the public 
and private sectors, and others. 
 
Consumer food service has many categories, ranging from full service restaurants through to 
street stalls/kiosks (Euromonitor, 2015c). Total sales came to R78.3bn in 2014 (Euromonitor, 
2015c:4), of which food was 72% and beverages was 28%. For comparison this is equivalent to 
about 15% of the total wholesale and retail market. Two-thirds of consumer food service sales 
were from stand-alone outlets, and 20% of sales were from outlets in retail locations, like 
shopping centres and malls (Euromonitor, 2015c:6). There were a total of 115 529 units/ 
outlets in 2014 and just 7.6% of these were chain outlets. Of the 106 772 independent outlets, 
around three quarters (78 889) were street stalls/kiosks (Euromonitor, 2015c:5). This market 
is growing on the back of increasingly time-constrained consumers, who are doing less home 
cooking and are seeking convenient ‘meal solutions’ and ‘value-for-money’ (cheaper) offerings 
(Euromonitor, 2015c:3). Changing gender power relations in the home and increasing labour 
market participation by women are other key factors. 
 
Despite this large number of outlets, the top three corporations operating in consumer food 
service – Yum! Brands (KFC), Spur Corp (Spur, Panarotti’s, John Dory’s and others) and Famous 
Brands (Wimpy, Steer’s, Debonair’s and others) – had sales of R38bn, or 48.5% of market share 
in 2014 (Table 6). Together with Nando’s and McDonald’s, the top five corporations had a 61.2% 
share of the market. Chain operators are driving the market, and the recent licensing of US 
multinational brands Burger King and Domino’s Pizza by domestic companies signals 
expansion. This is a fast growing market with significant negative implications for nutrition and 
health (Igumbor, et al., 2012; Thow et al., 2015). This theme is taken up in more detail in other 
state-of-knowledge papers on the consumer food environment and local food geographies. 
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Table 6: Big three consumer food service companies, 2014 











Halimandaris family *  
Market share 20.4% 14.3% 13.8% 61.2% 69.6% 
Sales R16bn R11.2bn R10.8bn R47.9bn R54.5bn 
Operating 
profit   R566m   












Old Fashioned Fish 
and Chips, Fish and 









(Steers 509, Wimpy 
497, Debonair’s 




Old Fashioned Fish & 
Chips 371, 
Fish & Chip Co 311, 
King Pie 282 
Employees   1,442   
Sources: Euromonitor 2015c; McGregor’s 2015 
*Blank cells indicate this information that is not provided in available reports. 
 
In 2013 there were an estimated 30 000 hospitality establishments, ranging from five-star 
hotels to youth hostels (Ntloedibe, 2015:3). The leading hotel chains are domestic companies 
Protea, Sun International, and Premier Hotels and Resorts, with some US companies active: 
Mercure Accord, Legacy Hotels and Resorts, Sheraton and Hilton (Ntloedibe, 2015:5). Hotels 
operate autonomously for food purchases, operating on just-in-time supply. The source of 
supply was specialist retailers 32%, direct from manufacturers 28%, catering wholesalers 20%, 
fresh produce markets 12%, cash and carry 5% and general retailers 3% (Ntloedibe, 2015:5–6). 
 
The institutional/service sector includes transport services, health (public and private 
hospitals), educational institutions and prisons. This is a primary target for public sector 
procurement from black-owned and -controlled supplier businesses, but was valued at a 
surprisingly small US$71m (approximately R750m in 2013). Eighty percent of institutional food 
service is run through state tenders and parastatals. Twenty-eight percent of public sector 
catering and 55% of private sector catering is outsourced to contract caterers (Ntloedibe, 
2015:8). In 2013 contract catering was dominated by a few large companies, including Fedics 
(owned by Tsebo Outsourcing Group), Kagiso Khulani Supervision Food Services (owned by 
Compass Group Southern Africa), and Royal Mnandi (owned by MvelaServe Group – now under 
Bidvest), Royal Sechaba (Royal Serve), Feedem Pitseng (independent) and Bosasa 
(independent) (Ntloedibe, 2015:9). Contract caterers have their own suppliers, who were 
specialist retailers (46% of value in 2013), manufacturers/distributors 33%, catering 
wholesalers 10%, fresh produce markets 5%, general retailers 4% and cash and carry 2% 
(Ntloedibe, 2015:9). 
 
There are bidirectional relations between food retail and catering. As indicated, caterers and 
hospitality draw some of their supplies from retailers, while retailers get some of their supplies 
from food service companies, especially in the form of contracts for prepared meals for sale in 
retail outlets. ‘Meal solutions’ is a growing category, with a wide range of products from canned 
and frozen products to ready meals. Tiger Brands was the market leader in meal solutions, and 
Woolworth’s private label was the top brand in 2014 (Euromonitor, 2015d). Bidvest 
Foodservice constituted 54.7% of Bidvest’s total turnover in 2014, but only 6.5% of this was in 
Southern Africa, including South Africa, and the rest was in Asia Pacific and Europe (Bidvest, 
 
 
Working paper 32, Stephen Greenberg 21 
2014). Retailers and manufacturers, including Checkers (Shoprite), Unilever, Tiger Brands and 
others have established dedicated food service divisions. 
 
4. GOVERNANCE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN AGRO-FOOD SYSTEM 
System-wide governance 
Governance is used here to refer to the overall organisation and management of production and 
distribution in the food system and in specific commodity chains. There is an element of 
technical coordination, which is dealt with in the section on logistics above. However, 
governance goes beyond this technical element to incorporate broader processes of structuring 
of relationships in the system, the definition of key metrics (finance, quality, competence, etc.) 
and the division of tasks and management of these processes, etc. Kaplinsky and Morris 
(2001:30) divide governance into the legislature (making the laws), the executive 
(implementing the laws) and the judiciary (monitoring the conformance to laws). These are 
seldom performed by the same firm or entity in the system, i.e. there are usually multiple 
sources of governance. The effective exercise of sanctions is key to the functioning of 
governance. The most important governance actors are those where the system structure will 
disintegrate if they are not present. So, for example, an individual small-scale farmer or supplier 
is not a core governance actor, but large retailers are because the latter play a central role in 
setting standards and monitoring compliance across commodities. 
 
Although strong nation-state regulation characterised governance in the apartheid era, private 
interests did play a role in governance. Likewise, even with a shift to corporate power the state 
continues to play a governance role. It is more a question of the shifts in responsibilities and 
functions of different actors. In particular, corporate self-regulations have become more 
pronounced. 
 
Two overlapping governance systems can be considered. The first is governance at the level of 
the agro-food system as a whole, and the second is commodity-specific or value chain 
governance. Overall system governance covers regulations and the systemic structuring of 
relationships that affect all actors across the system, for example corporate governance, land 
and labour legislation and minimum food safety standards. Commodity-specific governance 
refers to the more specific and detailed governance of production and distribution systems by 
commodity. For example, governance systems for citrus fruit will be very different from those 
for meat in their details, with a different balance of forces and configuration of power, but both 
are subject to system-wide regulations and procedures. Value chain governance is the 
construction and maintenance of systems of value production and exchange. These are tied to 
specific commodities, which may be material or immaterial, but which have an exchange value. 
 
State regulation continues to play a very important role at the system level, despite a shift in 
power and control to corporations. This is evident in the current regulatory framework through 
which the corporate food regime governs in South Africa. For certain system-wide activities, 
effective governance is at a national level. First and foremost is regulation of corporate 
governance itself. Relevant national laws and policies include the Companies Act 71 of 2008, 
and other laws and policies on corporate governance (e.g. King III and IV), financial laws, labour 
laws and black economic empowerment (BEE). There is competition law with the Competition 
Act, with key roles for the Competition Commission and Tribunal in regulating capitalist 
competition (Lewis, 2012). The Public Investment Corporation (PIC) is governed by the Public 
Investment Corporation Act 23 of 2004 and the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. 
There are many more. These laws and regulations perform an effective regulatory role from the 
point of view of institutional integrity, contract enforcement, property rights and many other 
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dimensions necessary for the systemic functioning of capitalism. There may be points of conflict 
between capital and the state, for example over redistribution and BEE, but common ground is 
also found between the interests of the state and of fractions of capital.  
 
The state is also more specifically involved in regulating the agro-food system in many other 
ways. The list of relevant policies, laws and regulations is very long and this is a whole area of 
research in itself. One example amongst many is food safety and quality standards. The state – 
especially through DAFF, the Department of Health (DoH), the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), and also municipalities – plays a fundamental role in establishing and enforcing 
base food safety and quality standards. Between them, the three departments have very many 
detailed specifications and systems for standardising, monitoring and enforcement. South 
African has generally been free of regular outbreaks of food safety concerns, although more 
recently questions about food quality are emerging from consumers and civil society 
organisations (see Igumbor et al., 2012; Mountford, 2015). 
 
Mukumba and Hornsby (2011) provide a detailed description of the way the international food 
safety complex (IFSC) has rooted in Southern Africa. They identify the two most prominent 
institutions in the IFSC as Codex Alimentarius and the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement. The terms of these agreements are operationalised in the national agro-food system 
through an inter-departmental National Codex Committee with the DoH Directorate: Food 
Control as the national contact point. In short, Codex Alimentarius is a global agreement that 
sets global food safety standards and rolls them out nationally as the basis for trade. The 
WTO SPS Agreement regulates cross-border trade of agro-food products. DAFF’s International 
Trade directorate is the oversight institution. This is just one example of how the state 
continues to play a crucial role in agro-food system governance. 
 
Commodity-specific value chain governance 
As indicated earlier, the governance structure under apartheid was built on the basis of strong 
state regulations but with a central role for the boards and cooperatives that gave farmers and 
processors immense power in formal governance. The deregulation of marketing, which 
culminated in the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act in 1996, essentially moved governance 
structures away from tight state control and opened the room for industry self-regulation. The 
Act required the establishment of trusts to take receipt of control board assets; although in a 
number of cases the assets were distributed to producers (Bayley, 2000). One result of the 
dismantling of the control boards was a shift in power from representative organisations of 
producers (e.g. the South African Agricultural Union) and towards commodity-based structures. 
Corporations have significant influence over these institutions through direct representation on 
executive structures.  
 
The most obvious changes in food system governance relate to the shift in power from 
producers and processors to retailers who exert significant influence through control over 
supply chains, the definition, monitoring and enforcement of quality standards and criteria for 
participation in the chain. There is a huge body of international literature on the construction 
and control over standards by retailers and more generally the role of retailers in value chain 
governance. This control very directly shapes the character of food products that are made 
available to consumers. Much has been written on the dynamics of supplier relations and this 
will not be covered here. This relates to ideas of buyer-driven chains, lead firms and a range of 
flexible and hybrid governance styles (e.g. Sturgeon, 2000; Raikes et al., 2000; Kaplinsky and 
Morris, 2001; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Gereffi and Lee, 2012, for a small sample). Some of this 
material is compressed in the value chains overview produced as part of the CoE-FS research 
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Power asymmetries are central to value chain governance. Power is exercised through ensuring 
consequences in the chain and actively managing or coordinating the operations within specific 
commodity chains to ensure these consequences are met (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001:29–30). 
The retailers as the dominant entities control these processes closely, although there may well 
be a multiplicity of nodal points of governance and coordination functions (Kaplinsky and 
Morris, 2001:29). Retailers are able to dictate terms to suppliers who deliver products to central 
depots or warehouses for distribution to retail outlets using the retailers’ own transport 
network. Suppliers compete for shelf space and may have to pay slotting fees to secure space 
(SGE, 2013:43).  
 
There is a fairly large body of literature looking at the role of retailers, manufacturers and 
commodity associations in integrating black farmers into commercial value chains (e.g. 
Sartorius and Kirsten, 2006; Bienabe and Vermeulen, 2011; van Schalkwyk et al., 2012; van der 
Heijden and Vink, 2013; Du Toit et al., 2015). Most of the larger private sector agro-food 
companies and institutions downstream of primary production have some kind of small farmer 
procurement programmes, though these are generally small – a few hundred people at most. 
This is a specific field of research and will not be covered in detail here, but it is important to 
note because of the power imbalances in supply chain relations that often result in adverse 
incorporation of workers and smaller producers into commercial value chains (Hickey and du 
Toit, 2007; Du Toit, 2009). Mainstream views identify a number of challenges, including limited 
small-scale farmer access to market information; weak bargaining power; poor rural 
infrastructure; lack of access to finance and technical support; trust issues; and ability to meet 
rigorous requirements, including quality standards, volumes and consistency. The 
recommendations therefore focus on how to make producers/suppliers more efficient and 
perform better to enable their participation in value chains. However, other studies emphasise 
struggles for the appropriation of value, which moves the discussion out of a technical frame of 
reference and into a frame that explicitly recognises the political and power dimensions of value 
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Corporate power and the consumer food environment 
The consumer food environment essentially refers to the environment in which consumers 
make choices and decisions about food. The concept is covered in more detail in other research 
reports produced for this project. Many social, psychological, physiological, cultural and 
economic factors shape the choices people make about what to eat. One consequence of 
modernisation and capitalist expansion is a nutrition transition (Popkin, 1993; Igumbor et al., 
2012) away from diets high in cereal and fibre and towards diets high in sugar, fat and salt, 
which produce the greatest allure for the lowest possible cost (Moss, 2013; Mountford, 2015). 
 
These trends are apparent in South Africa (Steyn, 2006; Igumbor et al., 2012). Obesity is 
growing alongside continued nutritional deficiencies in South Africa. Seven percent of deaths 
were attributed to excess body weight in 2000, and 12% of the overall disease burden was 
linked to dietary intake and respiratory disease in 2004. There is a steady increase in per capita 
food supply of fat, protein and total calories, with salt intake in excess of recommended levels. 
This is linked to changes in dietary patterns as wealth increases, with increases in the sales of 
packaged foods (Igumbor et al., 2012:1). The largest increases in the consumption of sugar and 
sweeteners are through processed foods (Ronquest-Ross et al., 2015). Accumulated losses to 
South Africa’s GDP between 2006 and 2015 from diabetes, stroke and coronary heart disease 
alone were estimated to cost US$1.9bn, according to Prof. Karen Hofman at Wits University 
Department of Public Health (Mountford, 2015:2). 
 
Rising obesity rates and food-related non-communicable diseases present a complication for 
food corporations, since research implicates their products as a cause of many modern diseases. 
At the same time, corporations have a duty to shareholders to increase sales and make money. 
Packaged foods are very profitable but would not be as appealing without the amounts of added 
sugar, flavourants and salt (Mountford, 2015:1). Corporations make their profits off processed 
products with economies of scale and where the production process is controlled down to a 
very detailed level. The production process of breakfast cereals, for example, has been reduced 
to a set of standardised inputs that can be micro-adjusted as required to meet anticipated 
market demand. Products high in salt, sugar and fat content are easy and cheap to produce and 
are desired by consumers. Nutrient inputs are volume controlled. There is a standardised base 
product that can be tweaked to meet regulatory demands and consumer fads alike11. In such 
conditions, corporations may be able to adapt products to respond to consumer trends or fads 
for healthier food by increasing (synthetic) micro-nutrient inputs, or decreasing sugar or salt 
content, for example, without really changing the product at all. This suggests that consumer 
activism could result in some improvements in food content, but on the other hand, it does 
nothing whatsoever to challenge corporate power. 
 
Here we should view demand not as some naturally given consumer preference from 
consumers for particular products, but as the willingness of consumers to pay for the products 
that are made available. In this sense, food value chains are producer-driven rather than buyer-
driven (if the consumer is considered the ultimate buyer). This statement can lead us into a 
complex discussion about the extent to which food retail, and commodity distribution in 
general, can be considered as value adding. This is not the place for a longer discussion. This 
question is important, however, because it opens the way to incorporating consumers as part of 
the chain, whereas the notion of ‘drivenness’ in chains as used by Gereffi and others stops at the 
point at which exchange value is exhausted. By incorporating the end consumer, a different 
picture emerges of the structure of the food system and the distribution of power. The extension 
of Gereffi’s model to incorporate end consumers results in a re-characterisation of retailers/ 
distributors as producers (of value) and therefore agro-food chains as producer driven. 
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Further investigation is needed to get a better understanding of the factors that shape product 
formulation and innovation. It is apparent that shareholder returns is a major driver, which will 
lead corporations to formulating the cheapest products, with innovation focused on developing 
products that are cheap and easy to manipulate. Breakfast cereal is an example of product 
formulation and innovation that converts cheap, readily available bulk commodities (grain, 
sugar) into premium products with large profits. Further investigation might consider the 
technical constraints to such processes (for example, shelf life, possible chemical combinations, 
etc.) that are the domain of food technologists. Behind the scenes, food technology and product 
innovation is big business. The South African Association for Food Science and Technology 
(SAAFoST)12 is a national association of food technology professionals with about 2 000 
members, including institutional membership by many of the corporations mentioned in the 
agro-food system mapping above. Another body that deals with product formulation and 
innovation is the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) South Africa, which presents its 
mission as improved nutrition and food safety. ILSI’s decision-making body is composed of 
Bayer CropScience, Coca Cola, Kellogg, Monsanto, Unilever, Clover, DSM Nutritional Products, 
Mars Africa and Nestlé South Africa13. Apparently neutral food technology is channelled in the 
interests of corporate profitability. 
 
Apart from product formulation and innovation, corporations also pursue other efforts to 
increase the demand for cheap, easily manipulated products. Advertising, including to children 
is the most obvious method for altering consumer perceptions of products with poor nutritional 
value. Food and beverage companies were the top four advertisers in South African in the first 
half of 2014, and were 12 of the top 50 advertisers: Unilever (1), Shoprite (2), Pick n Pay (3), 
SABMiller (4), Massmart (9), Distell (17), Yum SA (18), Famous Brands (30), Tiger Brands (32), 
Coca Cola SA (35), McDonald’s (37) and Spur Steak Ranches (49). Unilever’s adspend was 3.6% 
of the total from January to August 2014, and Shoprite’s was 3% (Financial Mail, 2014:59). 
Manufacturers and retailers collaborate on sales promotions and packaging to give the 
impression of a healthy product (Igumbor et al, 2012:5). The use of data mining and analytics 
leads to ‘predictive marketing’14. 
 
Corporate strategies to alter the CFE include increasing processed food availability through 
supermarket expansion into lower income areas; using informal channels; aggressive expansion 
by fast food chains; and increasing affordability, especially through corporate economies of 
scale and supply chain efficiencies (Igumbor et al., 2012:4). Healthier food products that are 
more readily available through supermarkets are typically 10–60% more expensive than less 
healthy foods by weight, and 30–110% more by cost of food energy. Refined cereal and foods 
with added sugar and fat are amongst the lowest cost sources of energy, while nutrient-dense 
foods (e.g. lean meats, fish, fruit and vegetables) cost far more (Igumbor et al., 2012:4).  
 
Corporate influence on dietary guidelines is another area of demand construction. The state 
plays a coordinating role in regulating basic food nutrition, but under the influence of scientific 
advisors, many of whom are located in corporations. Corporate influence is expressed through 
PPPs, sponsorship and association with dieticians’ associations and a range of other institutions 
that influence government policy, including SAAFoST, the Association of Dieticians of South 
Africa (ADSA) and the Nutrition Society of South Africa (NSSA). SAAFoST sits on the Food 
Legislation Advisory Group in the DoH and launched the Food Advisory Consumer Service in 
1995 to provide ‘factually/scientifically correct information on food issues’ together with ADSA, 
the DoH and the South African National Consumer Union15. The Consumer Goods Council of 
South Africa, whose members are retailers, wholesalers and manufacturers of consumer goods, 
                                                             
12 http://www.saafost.org.za 
13 http://www.ilsi.org/SouthAfrica/Pages/AOM.aspx  
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has a Food Safety Initiative16 where it claims to offer ‘objective, independent scientific advice’ 
and assistance in terms of related legislation. It has made inputs on food ingredients, the South 
African Food-based Dietary Guidelines and the South African Food Guide. While such 
partnerships between government, consumer representatives and food producers could be 
beneficial, in their current structure they are driven by corporate interests. 
 
ADSA influences government food policy, with ties to food corporations. ADSA sponsors include 
Sea Harvest, Huletts Sugar (EquiSweet), Kellogg’s, Pick n Pay, DSM, Woolworths, Nativa, 
Unilever, Parmalat, Pronutro and Health Connection (Mountford, 2015:3). It has diamond, 
silver, gold and platinum sponsors, with diamond status costing R64 000 in 2014. The ADSA 
president, membership relations manager, and communications manager were all staff of 
Kellogg’s in 2014 (Mountford, 2015:4). ADSA and NSSA provide a veneer of scientific neutrality 
to the branding of ‘healthy’ foods, for example, ‘health bars’ even though these have very high 
sugar content. Another example of corporate influence on the CFE is through ‘health by 
association’, e.g. Kellogg’s sponsorship of the NSSA’s 2014 Nutritional Congress and ADSA, or 
the training of nutrition professionals (Mountford, 2015:2). This legitimisation of food 
companies as global health experts is fuelled by a growing number of PPPs with public health 
organisations. Food companies are rebranding themselves as nutrition companies, asserting 
authority not only over food production but also malnutrition, obesity and even poverty 
(Mountford, 2015:3). 
 
Corporate nutrition, health and wellness initiatives are another way in which corporations are 
seeking to take control of trends in the population towards healthier food. All the major 
manufacturers have their own nutrition, health and wellness initiatives, for example Tiger 
Brands’ Eat Well, Live Well initiative works with the Nutrition Information Centre at University 
of Stellenbosch to offer guideline daily amounts (GDAs). Tiger Brands’ Foundation supports an 
in-school breakfast feeding programme with the Department of Basic Education (Tiger Brands, 
2014:121). Coca Cola’s Beverage Institute for Health and Wellness in Southern Africa17 claims to 
be ‘a resource for health professionals on the science of beverages, hydration and active healthy 
living’. It is based on poor argumentation that says all calories are equal so therefore it doesn’t 
matter what food you eat, it is only the amount. This is easily countered with the example of 
refined sugar being high in calories (energy) but low in nutrients compared with other foods. 
Such corporate initiatives indicate a privatisation of health standards and attempts to impose a 
private sector authority in the field of health and nutrition (An et al., 2013). 
 
Under pressure from public health advocates, in particular, government introduced draft 
regulations to reduce sodium content in processed food; regulations limiting trans-fats were 
applicable from 2011; and there are efforts to regulate sugar content (Steyn et al., 2003; SGE, 
2013:18). Government efforts are fairly weak, with some work on product labelling, marketing 
to children and product reformulation. Nutritional labelling remains voluntary unless a claim is 
made and there is a standard format for labelling and requirements for use of certain terms (e.g. 
‘high in’, ‘free of’). Voluntary GDA labelling is used by a number of big organisations 
(Igumbor et al., 2012:5). Nutritional claims must be supported by an analysis done on the 
product by a reputable laboratory accredited by the South African National Accreditation 
System (SANAS), following procedures set out in regulations, and endorsements can only be 
granted by an organisation run by professionals (SGE, 2013:17). As indicated, though, the 
neutrality of professional organisations may be compromised by corporate sponsorship and 
influence. In 2007, draft guidelines were developed to prohibit advertising of non-essential 
foodstuffs to children under 16, but these were shelved. Companies responded with a voluntary 
pledge with limited scope, without specific commitments, and no monitoring reports have been 
released (Igumbor et al., 2012:6). In February 2016 the Minister of Finance announced a tax on 
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sugar to be levied with effect from April 2017, and it remains to be seen how that may be 
implemented, or what impact it will have. 
 
5. TRENDS AND DYNAMICS IN THE AGRO-FOOD SYSTEM 
Agro-food trade 
In the era of national regulation, both exports and imports of agro-food products were 
regulated. Already in the 1920s perishable product exports were controlled and sugar imports 
were regulated; in the early 1930s wheat, flour and meal imports were restricted, while exports 
were subsidised (Bayley, 2000:15–17). Wheat imports were subject to quantitative and 
qualitative controls and were purchased by the statutory Wheat Board on behalf of the 
government. Qualitative controls meant Australian or Canadian wheat was favoured over 
Argentine wheat (World Bank, 1994:70). Deciduous and citrus fruit, which were major export 
crops, both had statutory single-channel export schemes. Deciduous fruit went through the 
board, and in 1988 the single channel monopoly was taken over by the private Universal 
Frutrade Cooperative (Unifruco), partly as a measure to escape sanctions against apartheid 
(World Bank, 1994:72). In citrus, Outspan was the monopoly channel. 
 
This changed after 1994, with the signing of the WTO AoA, which was a key feature in the 
restructuring of the food system in the early 1990s. The agreement required signatories to 
convert trade controls into a system of standardised tariffs and to reduce these tariffs over time. 
It also required countries to open up their domestic markets to a certain minimum of imports, 
and a reduction in export subsidies. Without going into detail here, the WTO AoA was tailored to 
the interests of ‘the Quad’ (the United States, European Union, Canada and Japan), and the terms 
of the WTO AoA allowed the US and the EU to secure their domestic programmes at a global 
level while extending the opportunities for exporting by limiting the right of other countries to 
close their markets (Einarsson, 2000). 
 
Trade liberalisation and deregulation in South Africa were strongly influenced by large-scale 
farming and processing entities that sought new markets (Bayley, 2000). Trade liberalisation 
went hand in hand with the dismantling and privatisation of the control boards and the single 
channel marketing systems. This resulted in the extension of corporate control over marketing, 
for example the merging of Unifruco and Outspan into Capespan and its more recent 
subsumption under Zeder (see Figure 5). The state continues to play a regulatory role, 
especially in quality control, to comply with international standards, for example through the 
Perishable Products Export Control Board and others. 
 
Vink and van Rooyen (2009:7–8) provided an overview of trends in trade in agricultural 
products since deregulation, including the following: imports have grown faster than exports, 
including in manufactured food goods; imports grew from around 5% of total agricultural 
output in 1965 to about a fifth in 2005; and Argentina became a significant source of imports, 
especially in the form of animal feed. 
 
The main market for agricultural products is domestic, but there is also a significant export 
market. Agro-food exports18 were valued at R84.5bn in 2014 (DTI, 2015), of which 
manufactured food was just over a quarter. The proportion of processed to unprocessed exports 
has risen rapidly from under 60% in the mid-2000s to 70% in 2012 (DAFF, 2015:80). According 
to AFMA figures, primary unprocessed exports were valued at R48.7bn in 2014 (AFMA, 2015). 
Figure 3 shows export values adjusted by the real effective exchange rate (REER), which 
                                                             
18 Excluding live trees and other plants; beverages, spirits and vinegar; residues and other waste products (mainly for animal 
feed); and tobacco. 
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measures changes in the weighted average purchasing power of the rand (ITAC, 2014:18) based 
on the year 2000. Rand weakness after 2007 facilitated an expansion of exports, especially in 
vegetable products (incorporating horticultural and field crops) and, to a lesser extent, in 
manufactured food.  
 
Fruit and nuts is by far the largest export category. This sector is one of the ‘winners’ in trade 
liberalisation. The main Southern African Customs Union (SACU) exports in 2014, most of which 
are from South Africa, were: citrus R11.6bn (14%); wine R8bn (10%); grapes R6.3bn (8%); 
apples, pears and quinces R5.7bn (7%); and maize R5.1bn (6%). Wool is the main animal 
product exported at R2.8bn and, after maize, sugar is the biggest field crop export (R3.5bn) 
(DAFF, 2015:81), with sugar production also coming from Swaziland in SACU. The European 
Union (led by Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and Southern Africa (led by Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique) are the two largest export markets (DAFF, 2015:81). 
Figure 3: Exchange rate adjusted agro-food export value, 2000-2013 
 
Sources: DTI, 2015; REER from ITAC, 2014 
 
The preliminary total of all agricultural imports was R61bn (around 6% of total merchandise 
imports) in 2014 (DAFF, 2015:80). According to the DTI (2015), South African food imports19 
were valued at R56.3bn in 2014. Whichever of these is correct, the figures indicate a positive 
trade balance for agro-food products. Of total food imports, R16bn (28%) was manufactured 
food, with sugar and sugar products in turn contributing 28% of manufactured food imports. 
Imports of soft drinks increased by 92% between 1995 and 2010 and imports of processed 
snack foods increased by 83% in the same period (Thow et al., 2015). Agro-food imports as a 
percentage of total imports has remained fairly stable since 1990, ranging between 5–7% of the 
total. Overall, however, imports tend not only to be cheaper than local products but also to be 
nutritionally better. Domestic products tend to have higher sodium and saturated and total fat 
content than imports (Igumbor et al., 2012:5). 
 
There was a sharp rise in the value of agro-food imports, especially after 2005. Figure 4 shows 
imports adjusted for the REER, indexed to 2000. Although there was a temporary drop after the 
                                                             
19 Excluding live trees and other plants; beverages, spirits and vinegar; residues and other ‘waste’ products (mainly for 
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2008 global economic crisis, imports have continued expanding, especially vegetable products 
(horticulture and field crops) and manufactured food imports. Major SACU agricultural imports 
in 2014 were wheat R5.5bn (9%), rice R4.6bn (7.5%), poultry meat R4.1bn (6.7%), and palm oil 
R3.8bn (6.2%) (DAFF, 2015:82). Major importing countries in order of value are the United 
Kingdom, Argentina, Indonesia, Brazil, Netherlands, China and Germany (DAFF, 2015:82). 
Figure 4: Exchange rate adjusted agro-food import value, 2000-2013 
 
Sources: DTI, 2015; REER from ITAC, 2014 
 
Increased poultry imports from the US are targeted as a trade-off for South African participation 
in the United States’ African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA). In 2014 poultry imports were at 
12.5% of domestic production, and, if South Africa agrees to AGOA’s terms, this figure will rise, 
leading to concentration in domestic poultry production. (There are already rumours, for 
example, that Astral may seek to acquire Sovereign Foods.) This certainly will lead to cost 
cutting and job losses, but from a DTI point of view, it may be seen as a necessary trade-off for 
expanded trade to the US in other sectors, notably automobiles (Kripke, 2015; Spector, 2015). 
 
South Africa has a number of dedicated food importers, including Patley’s (owned by Bidvest), 
Tacoma Foods, M&L Distributors, Rieses Food Imports, Mistro Catering Supplies and others 
(SGE, 2013:42–43). Retailers have their own in-house import departments and may also use 
third party distributors/importers. Distributors can add as much as 30% to the cost of imported 
goods (SGE, 2013:43).  
 
Financialisation and institutional ownership 
It must be noted that this is only a preliminary analysis. There are many complexities in 
tracking ownership, not least that publicly traded shares often do not give the full picture of 
ownership. Some shares may be allocated privately and given greater weight/voting rights. This 
allows private investment consortia or families to control companies, even when the majority of 
publicly traded shares are held by others. More investigation on this is required. We also need 
to incorporate skills for financial analysis of corporate reports, because a lot of detail is hidden. 
 
At the outset we need to define or at least describe some key characteristics of financialisation 
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Reberioux (2005:1) describe financialisation as growth in the liquidity of capital markets, the 
quantification and transfer of risk, and an upsurge of investment funds responsible for the 
management of continually increasing savings. They use the term ‘finance-led capitalism’ to 
describe this new growth regime. They highlight tradability of securities and the transfer of 
risks (Aglietta and Reberioux, 2005:3). Financialisation of the economy has enabled the spread 
of new technologies, while dramatic technological changes have catalysed the establishment of a 
finance-led regime. The development of venture capital in this period is notable. Increased 
network density and digitising of information have increased the information-processing 
capacities of capital markets (Aglietta and Reberioux, 2005:19–20). 
 
Analysis of the role of finance capital and financialisation in the South African agro-food system 
is in its infancy. The only published work, by Ducastel and Anseeuw (2015), starts the process of 
looking at ways in which farmland and agricultural assets are converted into financial assets. In 
South Africa the role of finance in the agro-food system is manifested in various ways, two of 
which are the institutionalisation of share ownership and the growth of agri-investment 
companies. The expansion of consumer credit, wider financial inclusion and their impacts on 
food markets require further research. Another area that requires analysis and monitoring is 
the use of risk-based financial instruments, such as derivatives, securities and futures as a profit 
centre in productive entities. These activities are central to the activities of financial institutions, 
especially with deregulation in the late 1990s. To date, this still appears to be a very minor 
portion of agro-food corporations’ profit as a direct activity, although more investigation is 
warranted. In South African agro-food corporations, these instruments are used, but it appears 
mostly for the original purpose for which they were constructed, i.e. hedging against commodity 
and currency volatility, rather than as profit centres in their own right. In many cases these 
activities currently are running at a small loss, according to corporate annual reports. Further 
research is needed to extend the work on financialisation, including the impact of 
financialisation on value extraction from productive assets. 
 
Institutionalisation of share ownership refers to the rise to control of institutional shareholders, 
most significantly pension funds, but also including other public shareholdings by unit 
trusts/mutual funds, other management funds, corporate holdings, sovereign wealth, insurance 
companies, depository receipts, exchange traded funds, custodians, investment trusts and hedge 
funds. Non-public institutional shareholders can be added to this, including empowerment 
holdings, corporate own holdings and share trusts/share incentive schemes. At the moment, 
this is just at the stage of naming, but it helps to map out what we are looking at first to know 
where to focus. In this case, pension funds and agri-investment companies are the focus of our 
attention. These are dealt with very briefly here. 
 
The Public Investment Corporation (PIC), whose primary mandate is to manage the funds of the 
Government Employee Pension Fund (GEPF), has approximately 13% of total market 
capitalisation on the JSE20. It is the largest investment fund operating in South Africa, with assets 
under management at around R1.6 trillion in 2014 (PIC, 2014:i). The GEPF constitutes 89.3% of 
assets under management, and the Unemployment Insurance Fund 5.8%. (PIC 2014:4). From 
corporate annual reports and McGregor’s it is possible to get a rough idea of PIC/GEPF 
shareholdings in the agro-food system. Although shares held fluctuate, it is apparent that 
PIC/GEPF is a major shareholder in many of the largest corporations operating in the agro-food 
system (Table 7). PIC/GEPF is often the largest single shareholder in a context where 15% may 
confer effective control.  
  
                                                             
20 http://www.pic.gov.za/index.php/investments/listed-equities/  
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Table 7: PIC/GEPF share ownership in major corporations related to the agro-food system 2014 
Shares Companies 
15-20% Astral Foods, AVI, Barloworld, Bidvest, Remgro, Sasol, Spar, Super Group, 
Vukile, Woolworths 
10-15% Brait, Grindrod, Growthpoint, Hyprop, Imperial, Omnia, Pick n Pay Stores, 
Reinert, Sasol, Shoprite, Tiger Brands, Tongaat Hulett 
5-10% Attacq, City Lodge, Famous Brands, Illovo, Massmart, Oceana, Pioneer Foods, 
PSG Group, Quantum Foods, Resilient, SABMiller, Sovereign Food 
1-5% Clover, KAP Industrial, Pick n Pay Holdings, RCL Foods 
Sources: Annual reports 2014; McGregor’s 2015 
 
PIC has very well-defined parameters for its investments, including allocation limits to different 
asset categories (PIC, 2014). The GEPF mandate is for investment in infrastructure 
development, job creation, and the provision of social amenities to South Africans (PIC, 2014:5); 
and a mandate of 5% of investments to go into the rest of Africa, in developmental investments 
and private equity (PIC, 2014:6). In 2014, domestic listed investments were 70% of total 
allocations, domestic unlisted investments were 20%, and offshore was 10% (PIC, 2014:62). 
Unlisted investments cover a number of categories, including agriculture, agro-processing, 
manufacturing and beneficiation, and retail property (PIC, 2014:63). Five percent (R335m) of 
developmental investment went to agriculture and agro-processing in 2013/14 (PIC, 2014:82); 
4% of private equity allocations went to agriculture and agro-processing (R472m); and 51% 
(R6bn) went to industrial (PIC, 2014:87). 
 
Another source of pensions is from within the corporations themselves. More analysis needs to 
be done on financial reports in this regard, to identify where worker pensions are being 
invested. Needless to say, in both the public and private pension funds individual contributers 
do not have significant control over investment decisions, despite the value notionally being 
theirs. Contributers have very limited or no voice through their share ownership because their 
financial contributions are atomised before being aggregated under the control of an investment 
institution. Workers and consumers lack control or say over these vehicles, even when the funds 
are their own future pensions. Control is exerted from the top, through management and 
shareholders. Other South Africa-based financial institutions such as Stanlib, Coronation, Allan 
Gray and others are also significant investors in agro-food corporations, though not as large as 
the PIC. Overall, some of the biggest South African agro-food corporations have institutions as 
their controlling shareholders. These include Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods, AVI and Shoprite. 
 
The last few years have witnessed the rise of agri-investment companies in South Africa. These 
companies are listed on the stock exchange. They make acquisitions in the agro-food system and 
elsewhere in the economy, domestically and globally, to construct an investment portfolio. 
Johann and Anton Rupert with Remgro and Jannie Mouton at PSG with controlling stakes in 
Zeder are part of the Stellenbosch-rooted Afrikaner business elite (Formby, 2007). The Rupert 
family have widespread interests, including Geneva-based luxury goods operation, Richemont. 
Apart from its food system investments (see below), Remgro’s other major investments are in 
FirstRand/RMB, MediClinic and RMI. PSG has interests apart from Zeder, including Capitec Bank 
and investment funds. Christo Wiese, the Chair of Shoprite, has a large stake in Brait, which 
recently acquired and delisted Premier Foods. In 2014 he had significant holdings in resources 
group Pallinghurst, industrial services conglomerate Invicta and property hybrid Tradehold 
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Figure 5: The agri-investment web, 2014 
Source: Stephen Greenberg, 2016 
 
Remgro had a market capitalisation of R127.9bn in June 2014, while Zeder had a market cap of 
R12bn at the start of 2014. Brait is an unlisted fund. Figure 5 shows the web these interests, 
together with the PIC, have woven through the agro-food system. Remgro’s major agro-food 
interests are in RCL Foods (incorporating Foodcorp, Rainbow and TSB Sugar), Distell, Unilever 
South Africa and Grindrod (with stakes in Senwes and NWK). Zeder’s main interest is in Pioneer 
Foods via Agri-Voedsel, then Capespan, Kaap-Agri and Zaad seed company. PSG and Zeder were 
recently criticised for the extraction of large investment management fees on an essentially 
passive investment in Pioneer Foods (Hasenfuss, 2015). The PIC holds the web together, linking 
Zeder and Remgro to Christo Wiese’s agro-food interests in Premier Foods via Brait, and a 
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A related issue tied to financialisation and institutionalisation is the globalised character of 
ownership, leading to a dissipation of domestic control. Examples are the acquisitions by 
Monsanto of Sensako and Carnia, two of South Africa’s largest seed companies at the time, and 
the more recent acquisition of Pannar by Du Pont Pioneer Hi-Bred. In fertiliser, Kynoch is now 
owned by Export Trading Group, an MNC originating in Kenya. Afgri (formerly OTK), the largest 
agri-services and grain storage and handling corporation in South Africa, was delisted and is 
now owned by a Canadian-led private investment consortium called AgriGroupe. In sugar, Illovo 
is now a subsidiary of Associated British Foods, one of the largest sugar companies in the world. 
Massmart is majority owned by Walmart. And, most recently, SABMiller, currently the second or 
third largest corporation on the JSE (but, for some time, not majority owned by South African 
based shareholders) has recently accepted a buyout offer from AB Inbev. But even corporations 
that are still mainly owned by domestic shareholders have large minority foreign shareholdings. 
Tiger Brands, for example, was 49.1% foreign owned in 2014 (Tiger Brands, 2014:253). 
 
The multinationalisation of South African agro-food capital 
There is some recent work on South African corporate agri-business expansion into Africa. In a 
comprehensive report ACB (2014) provided an overview across the agro-food system, looking 
especially at retailing, agro-processing, farming and inputs, with a focus on seed. The report 
identifies some of the largest players and highlights a number of drivers of agri-business 
expansion, including tight domestic market conditions and competition, land and labour issues, 
rising raw material and input costs, and returns on investment. Hall (2012) focused on 
organised commercial farmer expansion, as well as the expansion of sugar corporations, 
Tongaat Hulett and Illovo, into the region. Other research on sugar has followed (e.g. Dubb, 
2015; Martiniello, 2015; Sulle, 2015), showing further expansion and a shift in the location of 
value creation into the region. 
 
Louw et al. (2008) found that increased consolidation and concentration of regional fresh 
produce markets was taking place. South African supermarkets were leading the charge with 
centralised procurement strategies dominating. The authors also highlighted smallholder 
farmer exclusion from these regional chains, both through the demise of ‘traditional’ markets 
and the use of private standards that smallholders struggle to meet. Pardhun (2011) indicated 
further fragmentation of public fresh produce markets in Africa and their displacement by 
supermarkets, again with negative impacts on smallholder farmers who lose access to markets 
as a result. Pardhun focused on Shoprite in Zambia, following earlier work by Miller (2005). 
 
Campbell (2015) does show supermarket expansion, but questions its all-encompassing nature, 
using arguments from Humphrey (2007) and others to indicate the ongoing resilience and 
importance of informal and open air fresh produce markets, even when supermarkets are 
present. This links to a whole field of research on informal food procurement and markets in 
Africa, with an expanding body of literature (e.g. Jayne, et al., 2010; Battersby, 2012; Wegerif, 
2015). 
 
There is other work on regional maize, livestock, soya and other commercial value chains, which 
functions more as a mapping of the terrain, with less direct emphasis on South African 
corporate expansion. USAID’s Southern Africa Trade Hub21 has sponsored notable work in this 
regard. While the National Agricultural Marketing Council’s useful commodity value chain 
studies22, which are published almost every year for some commodities, indicate size and trends 
in regional trade amongst other things, they do not provide much analysis. 
                                                             
21 http://www.satradehub.org/  
22 http://www.namc.co.za/pages/published-reports/research-reports/all-reports  
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Figure 6: South African agro-food corporate expansion, 201423 
Source: Stephen Greenberg, 2016 
 
The multinationalisation of South African agro-food capital is premised on a globally integrated 
flow of capital, economies of scale and global competition. Africa is a natural outlet for 
numerous reasons, including fast-growing consumer markets driven by urbanisation and 
greater but more concentrated wealth, and similarities in the socio-cultural context for South 
African corporations. South Africa remains a core market but has reached a point of saturation if 
higher returns are sought, which they generally are. According to AVI (2014:46), for example, 
the fairly small domestic market reduces the attractiveness of major new investment in South 
Africa. Some companies like Bidvest or the sugar corporations have most of their operations 
outside South Africa. On the other hand, Shoprite, which has the biggest South African agro-food 
corporate footprint on the continent, still has over 80% of revenue from South African 
operations. Investing externally may also be a hedging strategy against exchange rate decline, 
and weakening governance and infrastructure in South Africa.  
                                                             
23 Thanks to Dudu Coelho for assistance with the infographic. 
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Figure 6 indicates the nodal expansion of South African agro-food corporations into the region. 
This is based on information in annual reports for the largest corporations in each node. 
Logistics is the node operational in most countries, with 19 African countries hosting South 
African logistics operations. Wholesale and retail follows with 17 countries, then food 
manufacturing with 13 and agricultural services with 11. These are followed by primary 
production and fertiliser (with eight countries each), then grain/feed milling with four countries 
and retail inputs with one country. 
 
Outside Africa, logistics has the widest footprint, followed by fertiliser and food manufacturing, and 
then agricultural services and wholesale and retail. Regarding the number of corporations operating in 
each country, Table 8 indicates Zambia has the most concentrated activity, with 21 corporations 
operating there in 2014, followed by Swaziland (19), Mozambique (15) and Botswana (14). 
Table 8: South African corporate agro-food expansion in Africa and globally, 2014 
Country # of nodes # of top corporations 
Zambia 7 21 
Swaziland 7 19 
Mozambique 7 15 
Botswana 5 14 
Namibia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, Ghana  13-6 
Uganda, Angola, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, DRC, Ethiopia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles  5-1 
Outside Africa   
Europe and UK 3 5 
Middle East and Australasia 3 4 
Americas 3 4 
Sources: Derived from annual reports 
 
Shoprite and Bidvest have a footprint in the largest number of countries in the region (14 each), 
followed by Barloworld (12), then Imperial, Massmart and Woolworths (11 each). Shoprite’s 
African operations constituted 19% of group sales in 2014 (Financial Mail, 2015:55). Bidvest 
got about 40% of its operating profits from outside South Africa in 2014 (Bidvest, 2014:20). 
Corporations surveyed with a footprint of 10–6 countries are Illovo, Unitrans, Spar, Omnia, 
Country Bird and Pick n Pay. Those with a footprint of 5–1 countries are Tiger Brands, Tongaat 
Hulett, Foskor, Premier Foods, RCL/TSB, AVI, Afgri, Astral, Zeder, Pioneer Foods and Quantum. 
Bidvest and Barloworld both operate in all three of the market zones outside Africa. So, in 
combination, the current advance guard in regional expansion are Bidvest, Barloworld and 
Imperial in logistics, and Shoprite, Massmart and Woolworths in wholesale and retail. These are 
not only food operations but do include food. 
 
Food manufacturers and food service also distribute into additional countries, though they do 
not have physical production operations in these countries. Tiger Brands, for example, wholly 
owns Davita Trading, which exports Tiger Brands products to 33 countries in Africa, with 
Southern and West Africa the largest markets by value (Tiger Brands, 2014:43). According to 
the company, route to market in sub-Saharan Africa remains largely informal and reliance on 
local wholesalers and distributors to reach the final point of purchase remains critical to success 
(Tiger Brands, 2014:16). AVI (2014:22) has a network of third party distributors in countries 
where it does not have a direct presence. Pioneer Foods (2014:8) has a relatively small direct 
footprint, but exports to 80 countries, their largest markets in Africa being Algeria, Nigeria, 
Ghana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius and Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and the corporation also exports food products to North America, Europe and Asia.  
 
Challenges to regional expansion highlighted in recent times include lack of availability of 
suitable real estate (Woolworths, 2014:27). Supply chain challenges led Woolworths to 
withdraw from Nigeria in 2014. Tiger Brands (2014:30) highlights limitations on consumer 
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spending in Africa and an influx of new low-cost entrants, placing pressure on margins (Tiger 
Brands, 2014:43). Responses include a focus on product format, pack size and price points 
(Tiger Brands, 2014:30) and efforts to build brand recognition (AVI, 2014:22). 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The South African agro-food system has the characteristics of a corporate-led food regime, 
accompanied by economic concentration and centralisation of power, especially since 
deregulation in the early 1990s. Although there is an ongoing role for the state, the combination 
of greater corporate self-regulation and the multinationalisation of agro-food capital ensure a 
shift in the relationship towards greater corporate power. Characteristics of the contemporary 
regime include economies of scale, mergers and acquisitions and concentration and 
centralisation of ownership and power. 
 
However, power may be more widely distributed within the system than might be imagined. 
Each node in the system has a core with a periphery varying in size and degree of integration 
with the core. Specific commodities have their own dominant actors. This suggests more 
distributed power within the system, with a number of large core operations with concentrated 
power but spread out throughout the system. 
 
The initial mapping of the agro-food system also suggests that a simple buyer-driven/producer-
driven dichotomy is too abstract, even though the concepts are useful in assisting us to 
understand the distribution of power. Most importantly, product formulation and innovation – 
whether genetically modified seed or processed and packaged food products – suggest some 
aspects of producer-driven chains. This is reinforced if we incorporate consumers into the 
frame. Consumers are the ultimate buyers and users of the products, but the evidence indicates 
that consumer demand is shaped, sometimes quite significantly, by corporate producers and 
distributors in the system. Therefore producers at particular nodes in the chain and for 
particular commodities may exert greater power than buyers, or at least mediate the power of 
buyers. 
 
A key feature of the South African agro-food regime is the ongoing significance of a large 
periphery of economic actors in some parts of the system, at least. This is particularly the case 
in primary agricultural production, food retailing/distribution to the end consumer and 
consumer food service. There may also be a fairly large periphery around transport, especially 
around primary agriculture, but more information is required. This periphery is significant, 
both in the numbers of people involved, which reach into the millions, as well as in the value 
created. Value in the periphery tends to be located mainly in food distribution. This highlights 
the key importance of understanding this sector in livelihood and job creation. 
 
Corporate concentration appears to have been accompanied by a reduction in formal 
employment, especially in primary agriculture and in food manufacturing. While retail 
employment may have grown in the past two decades, this was accompanied by casualisation 
and flexible work, low pay, questionable and incomplete health and safety, long and irregular 
hours, etc. (see Kenny, 2001 for earlier work on retail, and Visser and Ferrer, 2015 for a recent 
update on similar processes in farm work). Taken together, the large periphery in some nodes 
and declining formal employment may suggest we need to investigate the livelihood creation 
potential of this sector, and the trade-offs between the protection and strengthening of the 
periphery or the expansion of the corporate one. More investigation could be done on these 
peripheries to understand them better and to identify what kind of support may be required 
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The intensified role of finance capital in commodity circuits is expressed in institutionalisation 
of ownership and control and associated globalisation. Workers are implicated in ownership 
and investment through their pension funds, but without any collective power over these 
investments. Faceless corporations and processes are dominant. A related trend is towards the 
multinationalisation of South African agro-food capital, driven by economies of scale and higher 
returns on investment. These reflect a dissipation of ownership and control from national 
confines. The state continues to play a crucial and central role in regulating the system, but 
more as a creator of an ‘enabling environment’ for corporate activity than as a counter to such 
activity. This poses challenging questions for the nation state and possibilities for using the 
nation state to expand and improve livelihoods and nutrition alike.  
 
At the same time as this concentration and centralisation, however, is the presence of a large 
periphery, both in value and in number of productive actors. In primary agricultural production, 
retailing and distribution, and food service (prepared food) in particular, there are high levels of 
economic participation, even if much of this is marginalised from nodes of power. There are 
hundreds of thousands or millions of economic actors in these nodes. Strategies need to be 
developed for how to strengthen these actors and their systems rather than seeing them as 
obsolete hangovers from the past destined for extinction. 
 
Further research 
There are many areas for further research. Deepening our understanding of each node is an 
ongoing task, especially given the dynamic and constantly evolving character of the system. It is 
difficult to develop appropriate policies or interventions without an understanding of the 
dynamics and function of particular commodity systems and sectors. More work still needs to 
be done to investigate and make visible the ways in which the nature and functioning of the 
agro-food system – and change within it – impact on the prospects for food and nutritional 
security and livelihoods for poor and vulnerable people. There is very little consolidated 
information about agricultural input supply in South Africa. Certainly corporations who are 
active in the sector will know what is going on but this information is not publically available. In 
primary agricultural production we continue to rely on outdated and questionable statistics 
about the size of the sector and the range of actors. While there is a lot of detail on specific 
commodities and production processes, this is fragmented and consolidated information is hard 
to come by. Logistics, agri-services, feedlots, grain handling and storage, horticulture sorting 
and packing, food manufacturing and consumer food service are largely unresearched areas. 
Probably the most work has been done on wholesale and retail but even here our knowledge 
tends to be case-study based. 
 
Retailer-supplier relationships are crucial to competition in the wholesale and retail sector, 
with implications for small and independent retailers and livelihoods in the node. Further work 
can be done to deepen our understanding on the dynamics of these relationships, which can 
feed into the Competition Commission’s current enquiry into the grocery retail market. 
 
Further work could be done on the grain-livestock complex. Surprisingly little attention has 
focused on this, given its centrality in the agro-food system and to rural economies. A simple 
start could be to map out the GLC inter-linkages throughout the system, and to understand the 
livelihoods created and the power dynamics that shape the complex. 
Other commodity-specific studies can also be conducted, each of which will have its own 
dynamics and core actors. The commodities selected could be derived from what different 
groups of people consume on a regular basis. This could include a specific focus on processed 
products as an increasingly consumed but problematic aspect of the food system in South Africa. 
Such studies can be conducted on demand with some lead time, or based on a yearly or 
programmatic selection. The approach adopted in this current report could offer a guide for the 
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construction of such commodity studies, including its relation to the broader agro-food system; 
a mapping of the nodes in the chain, looking at the corporate core and the periphery and their 
inter-relationships, value chain governance, dynamics shaping commodity-specific product 
formulation and innovation, trade dynamics and trends, issues of financialisation and 
ownership, commodity-specific regional and global expansion and at which nodes such 
expansion is taking place, and implications for livelihoods and nutrition.  
 
More work can be done on the impact of agro-food trade and trade policy on livelihoods and 
nutrition in South Africa. Initial work by Thow et al., 2015 looks at trade and nutrition in 
Southern Africa and this can be built on with a more intensive focus on South Africa. There is 
limited work on the impacts of agro-food trade on livelihoods, or on the trade-offs between 
cheaper imported food and livelihood creation in the agro-food sector. Questions for further 
investigation may include how the South African agro-food system is affected by international 
trade and trade policy and what are the implications for food security and livelihoods; more 
detail on what South Africa is importing/ exporting and why, with an emphasis on processed 
products; and the implications of the structure and function of global value chains for food 
security and livelihoods. 
 
Work on livelihoods could focus on nodes with large peripheries to understand the dynamics, 
support needs, inter-relations between formal and informal, extent of corporate displacement 
and other impacts on local food geographies. More work needs to be done on consolidating 
information on the number of formal jobs and overall livelihoods created throughout the 
system. 
 
Nutrition is a specialised area, but further work could focus on the impact of corporate 
concentration on nutrition, and more detailed investigation on product formulation and 
innovation, advertising, corporate influence on dietary and health advice and programmes, 
regulatory capture and the implications for the choice and quality of food consumers are 
offered. 
 
Finally, there is plenty of work to be done on looking at the ecological impacts of corporate 
power in the agro-food system. In particular, information is available but not yet consolidated 
on climate change and greenhouse gas emissions in the agro-food system, and on production 
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ANNEXURE 1: PRELIMINARY QUANTIFICATION OF VALUE IN THE 
AGRO-FOOD SYSTEM WITH SOURCES AND NOTES 
Node 2014 value 
of sales 
Source and notes 
Food wholesale and retail total  R519.4bn Ogando 2014 - figures don’t add up correctly in the 
USDA report but this is a close approximation (added 
category amounts and multiplied by US$/ZAR 1:10.6) 
Food and beverages manufacturing  R391.9bn Stats SA 2015 
Beverages R107.2bn (27%); ‘meat, fish, fruit, etc.’ 
(fresh produce) R105bn (27%); grain mill products 
R64.1bn (16.4%); dairy R34bn (8.7%); other food 
products R81.6bn (20.8%) 
Traditional grocery retailers and 
independent small grocers* 
R291.5bn Ogando 2014 - as above 
Formal food and beverages retail  R227.9bn Ogando 2014 - as above 
Supermarkets R181.3bn; other categories are 
convenience stores, hypermarkets and discounters  
Primary agricultural production  R208.3bn DAFF 2015 
Animal production R96.4bn; field crops R58.5bn; 
horticulture R53.3bn 
Current inputs to primary 
agricultural production total 
R138.2bn Stats SA 2013a for 2013 figure of R130.1bn, and DAFF 
2015 for increase in farm input prices to get a 2014 
figure 
Listed retail property funds  R117.7bn Financial Mail 2015a 
Value of retailing properties 
Finance to farms  R116.6bn DAFF 2015 
Food exports processed and 
unprocessed  
R81.3bn DAFF 2015 
Consumer foodservice  R78.3bn Euromonitor 2015d 
Food imports processed and 
unprocessed  
R61bn DAFF, 2015 
Animal purchases for primary 
production 
R29bn Stats SA 2013 inflated by 5% for 2014 figure 
Animal feed  R27.8bn Stats SA, 2013 for 2013 figure of R26.6bn, and DAFF 
2015 for increase in feed prices to get a 2014 figure 
Food and beverages containers and 
packaging  
R21.6bn Stats SA 2011 for 2011 figure of R16.6bn, and DAFF 
2015 for increase in packing material prices to get a 
2014 figure 
Transport out – manufactured food, 
beverages and tobacco  
R15.1bn Stats SA 2014; 2014a; 2015a 
Fertiliser  R10.3bn Stats SA 2013 for 2013 figure of R10bn, and DAFF 2015 
for increase in fertiliser prices to get 2014 figure 
Freight transport (primary 
including forestry) 
R10.2bn Stats SA 2014; 2014a; 2015a 
Seed and plant material  R5.5bn Sansor 2014; 2014a; 2014b 
Agronomy R4.1bn (77% maize); horticulture R0.9bn; 
forage and pasture R0.5bn 
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